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Abstract 
This thesis explores the importance of an appropriate understanding of ethics in sustainability 
transitions. Through a conceptual analysis, it finds that the dominant understanding of 
modernist ethics is unsuitable to the contexts of contingency in sustainability transitions, and 
that the participatory understanding of ethics as a complex system presents a far more 
adequate approach to the ethical complexity of socioecological systems. In particular, the 
strategy of „practising provisionality‟ is suggested, which understands the process of ethical 
decision-making as a process of social learning. This argument is further supported by a 
critical reflection on the food system context.  
The present dangers and future uncertainties of sustainability transitions are issues of 
incredible complexity. Socioecological interactions can have unpredictable impacts on our 
ability to the needs of both current and future generations, like realising a sustainable food 
system. Moreover, there are difficult decisions that we also to make in such dilemmas, like 
the extent of natural resource exploitation, where normativity plays a large role. This means 
that these complex issues are also ethical issues. The importance of understanding ethics in 
sustainability transitions is, therefore, of great importance, since we will want to believe we 
are making the „right‟ choices in these changing contexts. However, the understanding of 
ethics that dominates traditional scientific thinking and academic inquiries represents a 
paradigm of thought that is insensitive to complexity of socioecological systems, and is 
therefore, inadequate in addressing the ethical complexity of sustainability transitions. In the 
context of food systems, this is demonstrated in the linear emphasis on food production that 
dominates the ethics of realising sustainable food systems. 
This thesis argues that a more appropriate way of thinking about ethics in times of contingent 
contexts and socioecological change would have to account for complexity. In an 
acknowledgement of the complexity of ethics, it is argued that every decision has elements of 
moral consideration, and that there is also no way to know objectively whether the respective 
decision was morally „right‟ or „wrong‟. Such an understanding of complex ethics would, 
therefore, emphasise the importance of recursively reasoning through every ethical decision 
to address any reductionisms of complexity; adopting an attitude of modesty and openness 
towards dialogue, and adopting a student mentality of social learning that would improve 
upon one‟s complex ethical reasoning.  Subsequently, the paradigmatic shift of a complex 
approach to ethics is more adequate in understanding ethics in sustainability transitions.   
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Opsomming 
Hierdie tesis ondersoek die belangrikheid van ‟n toepaslike begrip van etiek in 
volhoubaarheidsoorgange. Die bevinding van hierdie konseptuele analise is dat die  
oorheersende begrip van modernistiese etiek ongeskik is in die volhoubaarheidsoorgang 
konteks van gebeurlikheid en  dat die deelnemende begrip van etiek as ‟n komplekse sisteem 
‟n baie meer toepaslike benadering is tot die etiese kompleksiteit van sosioekologiese 
sisteme. Die strategie van „praktiese voorlopigheid‟ word in die besonder voorgestel. Dit sien 
die proses van etiese besluitneming as ‟n proses van sosiale leerwyse. Die argument word 
verder ondersteun deur die kritiese refleksie op die voedselsisteem konteks. 
Die huidige gevare en toekomstige onsekerheid van volhoubaarheidsoorgange is geweldige 
ingewikkelde strydvrae. Sosioekologiese interaksies kan onvoorsiene impakte hê op ons 
vermoeëns om die behoeftes van beide huidige en toekomstige generasies aan te spreek, soos 
om volhoubare voedselsisteme te laat realiseer. Verder is daar moelike besluite wat geneem 
moet word tydens sulke dilemmas, soos die mate waartoe ons natuurlike bronne geeksploiteer 
word, waar normativiteit ‟n groot rol speel. Dit beteken dat hierdie komplekse strydvrae ook 
etiese strydvrae is. Die belangrikheid van die begrip van etiek in volhoubare oorgange is 
derhalwe van groot belang, aangesien ons wil glo ons neem die regte besluite in hierdie 
veranderende kontekste. Die begrip van etiek wat die traditionele wetenskaplike denkwyse en 
akademiese navrae domineer, kom egter voor as ‟n paradigmiese denkwyse wat onsensitief is 
ten opsigte van die kompleksitiet van die sosioekologiese sisteme, en dus tekortskiet in die 
hantering van die etiese kompleksitiet van volhoubare oorgange. In die voedselsisteem 
konteks word dit gedemonstreer in die liniêre klem wat op voedselproduksie geplaas word, 
wat die etiek van die realisasie van voedselsisteme domineer.  
Hierdie tesis redeneer dat ‟n meer paslike denkwyse omtrent etiek in tye van gebeurlike 
kontekste en sosioekologiese veranderinge sal moet rekenskap gee van kompleksitieit. In die 
erkenning van die kompleksiteit van etiek, word dit geredeneer dat elke besluit ‟n element 
van morele oorweging het, en dat daar ook geen manier is om objektief te weet of die 
respektiewe besluit moreel „korrek‟ of verkeerd‟ is nie. So ‟n begrip van komplekse etiek sal, 
dus die belangrikheid van konstante redenering in elke etiese besluitneming beklemtoon, om 
enige reduksionisme van kompleksiteit aan te spreek. Dit geskied deurmiddel van ‟n houding 
van beskeidenheid en oopheid tot dialoog, en die aanneming van ‟n studente mentaliteit van 
sosiale leerwyse wat ‟n komplekse etiese redenering kan verbeter. Gevolglik, is die 
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paradigmatiese verskuiwing van ‟n komplekse benadering tot etiek meer paslik in die begrip 
van etiek in volhoubaarheidsoorgange. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Opening Remarks 
This thesis is the result of a wrestle with the issue of sustainability transitions, in particular 
with regard to sustainable food systems, and also with the issue of ethics.  
My interest in ethics had begun some time ago, as I grew dissatisfied with what I saw as the 
„moral deficit‟ of the West‟s consumerist lifestyle, and the seemingly complete disregard for 
the future of all life on Earth, for generations to come. Then, I had the privilege of working 
with the Stellenbosch University‟s Food Security Initiative, and their transdisciplinary Social 
Learning for Sustainable Food Systems project, with which I was given the opportunity of 
providing some philosophical insight into the question of ethics in food systems.  
My initial hope, therefore, was to develop an ethical manifesto, which would guide the 
project‟s academic inquiries going forward. However, with every project meeting, and with 
every piece of literature I read, I realised to my own dismay, that I could not follow through 
with my promise. Both my understanding and the team‟s understanding of ethics were 
predominantly stuck in an unsuitable way of thinking about, not only ethics, but about how 
the world works, and our relation to it. As my reading ventured into complexity theory and a 
complex conceptualisation of ethics, I started to see the world through new eyes, and I could 
not dare leave the team behind. As a result, I made a long-term decision that will hopefully 
benefit the project and also every individual team member: I had to park my own academic 
ambitions, and provide an accessible thesis that would inform how to think about our 
academic inquiries in a way that accounts for complexity, and as such, how this influences 
our understanding of ethics.  
The intention, of course, is that my dedication to the project and the „movement‟ will carry 
on, academically. However, that is for the topic of another thesis. In this case, my research 
has been focused on the notion that, before anything else, it is first necessary to put the 
project team and myself on adequate footing. Subsequently, rather than focus on a specific 
food systems issue, or provide an isolated case study, my aim for this thesis was to provide a 
way of thinking about this context that demonstrates an alternative to the paradigm that 
dominates traditional scientific thinking and academic inquiry – one which accounts for 
complexity – and as such, offer a suitably complex way of thinking about ethics in 
sustainability transitions.  
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1.2: Understanding the Link between Ethics and Sustainability 
Today, we find ourselves in a time of sustainability transitions (Swilling & Annecke, 2012), 
whereby we aim to prosper as a  responsible species in acknowledgement of the finite nature 
of natural resources and the interconnected stresses on socioecological systems. The effects 
of these crises have never before been experienced at the current scale of impact, and cut 
across our man-made borders and barriers. Sustainability transitions, therefore, “emerge 
when the following conditions are in place: finance capital has been disciplined; the 
digitization of production and consumption is further extended under the leadership of 
productive capital; and the installation of the „green-tech‟ revolution driven by finance capital 
is accelerated in response to deepening ecological crises” (Swilling, 2013:97). 
More interestingly, is that an approach to sustainability transitions not only contemplates 
sustaining life on Earth, but also “a search for good life and justice and ... [so] its normative 
character is undeniable” (Kagan, 2010:1098). However, when there are impoverished 
families on the streets of wealthy cities, and continued destructive exploitation of natural 
resources, the morality that is guiding the times has to be put under scrutiny. As such, it is 
necessary that an academic understanding of ethics is philosophically investigated, with 
regard to its appropriateness in these unpredictable times.  
In an acknowledgement of the importance of this research, this thesis will explore the 
understanding of ethics that dominates moral philosophy in modern Western culture, and 
given the unexplored territory of sustainability transitions and its normative expectations, 
discuss whether this understanding is suitable. However, it will be revealed that the paradigm 
of thought that rules over today‟s academic inquiries, including moral philosophy, subscribes 
“to the concepts of an out dated worldview, a perception of reality inadequate for dealing 
with our overpopulated, globally interconnected world” (Capra, 1996:4). This is particularly 
relevant in the context of food systems, where the problems of “pollution ... animal welfare, 
soil erosion, loss of genetic diversity, genetic modification ... and food safety are all swept 
under the carpet of profitable production” (Zimdahl, 2002:51). 
Of course, this presents a crisis of significant proportions, since the pressure of addressing 
this problem is not only unimaginably demanding, but the failure to do so would also be 
unimaginably unfavourable. However, it also presents an opportunity, since these 
“assumptions that have gone unexamined for decades are now being called into question, 
creating an opportunity for fresh thinking and innovative action” (McLachlan & Hamann, 
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2011:429). In this light, this thesis will argue that the current conceptualisation of ethics is 
not necessarily a matter “of a lack of moral integrity on the part of modern thinkers, but of 
the limitations of modernist rationality” (Cilliers, 2004:20). Subsequently, this thesis will 
argue that we need to rethink ethics in a way that would conceptualise this reorientation 
appropriately to the context of global polycrises; like ecosystem degradation, global 
warming, the phenomenon of „oil peak‟, inequality, mass urbanisation, an imbalance in 
material flows, and food insecurity (Swilling & Annecke, 2012). 
An appropriate understanding of ethics in sustainability transitions will have to develop from 
a critique of the underlying structures of thought that informs modern moral philosophy‟s 
conceptualisation of ethics. Indeed, as academia slowly comes to understand the gravity of 
our global crises and the seriousness of what is expected of us, the weight of any 
philosophical investigation can no longer be content in “explaining why something is the way 
it is, but it needs to address the question of how it got to be that way” (Heylighen et al., 
2007:131). As such, this thesis is as much about understanding as it is about understanding 
ethics. Subsequently, from such a critique, a more respectable notion of ethics can begin to 
grow from more adequate patterns of thinking, which will satisfy our approach to the 
contingencies of sustainability transitions.  
This thesis will argue that the alternative of complex thinking provides a suitable paradigm of 
thought in this context, and that the understanding of „complex ethics‟ that evolves out of this 
thinking, is sufficiently appropriate in addressing the ethical issues of sustainability 
transitions, particularly in food systems. Indeed, the literature that informs this argument for a 
revolutionary change of thought (Cilliers, 1998; Cilliers, 2000a; Cilliers, 2000b; Cilliers, 
2004; Morin, 1992; Morin, 2007; Woermann & Cilliers, 2012; Woermann, 2013) reveals that 
ethics is inseparable to a way of thinking that will account for the scale of the global 
polycrises.  
1.2.1: A Note on Complexity 
One of the foremost characteristics of sustainability transitions is that we are dealing with a 
complex reality (Swilling & Annecke, 2012). However, complexity is a term that, by its 
nature, defies the usual dictionary definition of a word, since it “is often loosely appropriated 
to describe things that lack simple explanations” (Woermann & Cilliers, 2013:403).  
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Although there is no standard „theory of complexity‟ that offers a neatly packed definition of 
what the notion of complexity means, one can recognise certain phenomena as having certain 
characteristics by which they are recognisable as being complex (Cilliers, 1998).  Moreover, 
only a system of dynamically inter-related components can be complex. The complexity is 
located in the nature of the organization between the different parts and is not a characteristic 
of the atomistic entities (Preiser, Cilliers & Human 2013; Morin, 1992). 
Nevertheless, just because it is a difficult concept to get our head around does not mean we 
must neglect its importance. On the contrary, it is something that we have to confront and 
grapple with, since an honest reflection on ethics in sustainability transitions – as is the 
intention of this thesis – reveals that it is, indeed, an extremely complex issue. Yet, the 
dominant way of thinking about the world and how we relate to it, has long excluded this 
reality from its academic inquiries, and from its theories that inform them; hence the situation 
that we find ourselves in today. Moreover, the „paradigm of complexity‟ (Morin, 1992) 
introduces a relational way of thinking that is often used to critique traditional scientific 
theories. 
This has led Cilliers (1998:127) to quite rightly say that “we need to come to grips with 
complexity in order to ensure our survival” – a statement that will resonate throughout this 
thesis. Therefore, in this study, I argue that a rigorous understanding of the key implications 
of the complexity thinking paradigm reveals that the underlying assumptions that inform our 
understanding of complex phenomena are deeply related to ethical issues. For the purpose of 
this study I draw on a very specific philosophical interpretation of complexity as informed by 
the work of Cilliers (1998, 2000a, 2000b) and Morin (1992, 2007). 
1.2.2: A Note on Systems Thinking 
It is important to note that the idea of sustainability transitions is “a young concept for an age 
of hypercomplexity, where challenges of increasingly globalizing economic exchanges as 
well as cultural exchanges are combining with the challenge of interconnected global and 
local ecological and social crises” (Kagan, 2010:1094). In order to discuss something that 
seemingly defies description, an appropriate approach would, of course, have to be sensitive 
to these exchanges.  
Therefore, this thesis suggests that, to account for these complex interactions between social 
spheres, ecological spheres, and the many other exchanges that occur within and in-between 
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these worlds, an open systems thinking approach would be necessary – a complex systems 
approach. Indeed, if our academic inquiries are to recognise the complexity of sustainability 
transitions, it is also necessary to account for the fact that, as “the different economic, social, 
technological and ecological systems that we are part of become ever more interdependent ... 
the result is an ever more complex „system of systems‟ where a change in any component 
may affect virtually any other component, and that in a mostly unpredictable manner” 
(Heylighen et al., 2007:117). 
As such, through this way of seeing the world, as complex systems, we are able to “identify 
problems and possibilities that are simultaneously multidimensional, dynamic and evolving” 
(Blewitt, 2008:41), and appropriately understand ethics in sustainability transitions. 
1.2.3: A Note on Food Systems 
The significance of sustainability transitions is an enormous thing to think about, and 
perhaps, the most important story that we will tell in our lifetimes. Furthermore, 
understanding ethics in this context in a way that accounts for complexity is something that 
requires time and space to reflect upon.  As such, there is the risk that we can get lost in this 
story if it is overcomplicated.  
For this reason, rather than the isolating character of a case study, it will be necessary that 
this thesis commits to a more tangible context, so that the argument of an appropriate 
understanding of ethics gains more traction. A case study will be more applicable hereafter, 
once the conceptual heaviness of complexity and its impact on our understanding on ethics 
has properly sunk into our ways of thinking in general. 
Food insecurity is one of the hallmark issues of the sustainability transitions challenge, since 
it identifies the precious balance between the ecological world and the social world that is 
needed to navigate life on Earth through these difficult times. On one hand, it represents the 
troubles at the heart of human survival, since “food is essential for people to live sustainable 
and healthy lives” (von Braun, 2009:9). On the other hand, of the same body, it represents the 
hardships of Nature‟s survival, because of our species‟ dependency thereon to thrive; as we 
plough the land and drink up the dams. As such, when food is the issue, it is for many people 
“their most immediate and regular connection with the earth” (McLachlan & Hamann, 
2011:429).  
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Moreover, the issue of food security is a complex one. This has been echoed by many authors 
(Battersby & McLachlan, 2013; Drimie & McLachlan, 2013; McLachlan & Hamann, 2011; 
Scherr, 2000; Swilling & Annecke, 2012; Thompson, 1998; Von Braun, 2009; Zimdahl, 
2002). For this reason, “a systemic approach is required to address food insecurity” (Drimie 
& McLachlan, 2013:217). In order to address food security, it is, therefore, necessary to 
address the food system. In other words, from this point of view, ensuring food security is 
about ensuring a sustainable food system.  
As such, the context that will be used as a soundboard to reflect on understanding ethics in 
sustainability transitions will be the food system.  
1.2.4: A Note on Social Learning 
The journey of sustainability transitions is itself a learning journey. Therefore, in introducing 
a reorientation of ethics, founded on the critique of the dominant paradigm of thought, this 
thesis demonstrates “a wider and ongoing, creative and prospective human endeavour” 
(Hattingh, 1999:80), which serves to better understand our contexts and the complexity 
thereof.  
The argument presented in this thesis should, therefore, not be taken for granted, but seen as 
part of a rich collection of ever-expanding academic thinking. As such, it welcomes critical 
and constructive reflection, from which present and future disciplines can continue their 
respective investigations in the context of sustainability transitions.  
Indeed, this emphasis on learning ripples throughout the literature that addresses 
sustainability and the need for a change in the way we think (Capra, 2002; Cilliers, 2006; 
Henry, 2009; Morin & Kern, 1999). This is most notable with the concept of „social 
learning‟, which itself is a term whose understanding is still developing (Cundill & Rodela, 
2012; Reed et al., 2010). Conveniently, the food systems context explicitly highlights the 
need to establish “effective approaches to research-policy linkages and social learning” 
(Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:217).  
However, this thesis will not go into depths concerning these developing definitions, as this 
will stray from the learning process of this thesis‟ argument itself; of understanding ethics in 
sustainability transitions. As such, the emphasis will rather be directed at establishing 
appropriate grounds of academic thought from which this process of learning can grow. 
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1.2.5: A Note on Writing Style 
In terms of style, along with regular academic writing, this thesis has employed the use of 
imagery – most notably metaphors and similes – when referring to the various scientific 
positions and paradigms. This has been done to complement the sticky subject matter with 
which one is posed when dealing with complex subject matter.  
Due to the nature of this idea of complexity – that it eludes concrete description and 
prescription – the use of imagery allows one to think creatively about the subject matter of 
different paradigms of thought, and how to critique these positions. This style, which mixes 
creative writing with academic writing, is not only necessary, but it is also not new. Indeed, 
this is all part of the process, since “in revolutionary times like these ... new ethical metaphors 
are coined, new principles are put on the table, and unexpected conclusions are reached” 
(Hattingh, 1999:80). For instance, the modernist paradigm of thought has been compared to a 
„machine mind‟, modernist ethics has been compared to an „engineered ethics‟, the complex 
paradigm of thought has been compared to the „mountain mind‟, complex ethics has been 
compared to an „emerging ethics‟, and complexity itself has been referred to as „beautifully 
messy‟. Furthermore, the use of imagery pays tribute to the dynamic and ever-changing 
notion of complexity, by refusing to reduce complex subject matter to concrete descriptions. 
Therefore, this represents a necessary way in which to write about the term, and as such, 
represents a complex style of academic writing.  
The use of narrative is also important in such circumstances. Although the choice was taken 
to stray away from using story-telling, this thesis does take advantage of the comforting use 
of the word „we‟, which helps to reinforce the notion that one is always in exploration when 
investigating complex subject matter. In this light, Warren (1998:262) notes that this  “gives 
voice to a felt sensitivity often lacking in traditional analytical ethical discourse ... [and] 
provides a stance from which ethical discourse can be held accountable to the historical, 
material, and social realities in which moral subjects find themselves”.  
Nevertheless, this is still presented in an academic environment, and subsequently, this 
creative approach will always be sure to support and source its imagination with reliable 
citations.  
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1.3: Methodology 
The methodology of this thesis aims to reflect on the perspectives provided regarding the 
question about whether our current conceptualisation of ethics is sufficient in addressing the 
sensitive and sticky realities of sustainability transitions. This thesis, therefore, takes the form 
of a conceptual analysis – a critical exploration of philosophical theory that reflects on the 
realities of the kinds of thought strategies that might be better equipped in dealing with 
sustainability transitions.  
To begin with, a variety of literature was read and further researched that reflected upon the 
paradigm of thought that has dominated the modern, Western world, and its influence in 
addressing the complex nature of reality, as well as the uncertainty of sustainability 
transitions. From that study, the focus was concentrated on how this „machine mind‟ way of 
thinking dealt with notion of ethics, and how it fares in addressing the contingency of moral 
dilemmas and the extended ethical issues of sustainability transitions. In response to the 
disappointing „engineering ethics‟ that is offered by such a „machine mind‟ paradigm, and 
which dominates our academic inquiries, the literature review continued, so as to look for a 
more appropriate understanding of ethics in sustainability transitions would look like.  
As the research delved into complexity theory and systems thinking, its acceptance of 
contingencies and its relevance with regard to reflecting upon the socioecological balance 
posed a more appropriate way of thinking to address sustainability transitions. Thereafter, the 
investigation of this alternative „mountain mind‟ way of thinking deepens into exploring how 
the notion of ethics is approached from this perspective. Subsequently, it is suggested that a 
„mountain mind‟ understanding of this allows for an „emerging ethics‟, which is cognisant of 
the acknowledgement of complexity. The study then proceeds by suggesting that such a new 
understanding of ethics is an appropriate way of addressing the contingency of moral 
dilemmas and the extended ethical issues of sustainability transitions. 
Thereafter, research continued into literature that dealt with the context of food systems, so as 
to understand the intricacy of this context, and the sustainability challenges it faces. Then, 
through a critical reflection, an approach to this context was engaged with from each 
paradigm of thought and its understanding of ethics, in demonstrating the inappropriateness 
of the „machine mind‟ and its „engineering ethics‟, and the appropriateness of the „mountain 
„mind‟ and its „emerging ethics‟. 
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The initial intention was to support this with field research, like interviews, observation, and 
the critiques of institutional and other formal documents. However, the literature regarding 
this subject matter is so dense and difficult to contextualise, that it has been necessary to 
commit the full time and opportunity of writing this thesis to a dedicated unpacking of this 
philosophical theory. As such, the argument of this thesis will only be informed by qualitative 
material, so as to secure a critical understanding of ethics in sustainability transitions. 
1.3.1: Structure of Study 
This study is divided into two parts. Part 1 is comprised of Chapter Two and Chapter Three, 
and offers a critical reflection on the dominant (or modernist) paradigm of thought and its 
understanding of ethics, namely the „machine mind‟ and an „engineered ethics‟, respectively. 
Part 2 is a response to Part 1. Mirroring the structure of Part 1, Part 2 is comprised of Chapter 
Four and Chapter Five, and presents an alternative paradigm to the modernist strategies by 
engaging with the implications of a paradigm of thinking that acknowledges complexity and 
its understanding of ethics, namely the „mountain mind‟ and an „emerging ethics‟.  
Chapter Two: 
Part 1 starts with Chapter Two, which aims to offer a philosophical critique of the modernist 
paradigm of thought that informs current scientific thinking and academic inquiries, namely 
the „machine mind‟. It consists of five sections and sub-sections that, together, provide a 
structured and comprehensive critical reflection of the modernist paradigm of thought. This 
will all be reflected upon in context of academic interest in sustainability transitions.  
The chapter begins by introducing the imagery that represents the way of thinking that 
dominates Western academia, namely „thinking like a machine‟. From this introduction, the 
next three sub-sections shed light on the fundamental principles of this way of thinking, as 
well as the implications thereof.  
The first sub-section investigates the foundational structure and rationale of this way of 
thinking, through the imagery of „making machines out of mountains‟. The second sub-
section explores how this way of thinking addresses the contingency of difference, through 
the imagery of „making divisions out of differences‟. The chapter continues with its third sub-
section, through the imagery of „taking the mountain out of the mountain range‟, 
complementing the previous two sub-sections with a critique on the specific implication of its 
disregard for the complex nature and importance of context.  
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The chapter ends by reflecting on the influence of this paradigm of thought in the food 
systems context, and based on the critique provided, exposes how this way of thinking 
complicates the possibility of realising sustainable food systems.  
Chapter Three: 
This chapter uses the previous chapter‟s critique as a springboard, so as to identify how 
modern moral philosophy thinks about ethics, and why this „engineered ethics‟ is 
inappropriate. Similarly, it consists of five sections and sub-sections that, in its critique, lay 
bare the failings of the modernist understanding of ethics. Again, this is reflected upon in 
context of a theoretical interest in sustainability transitions.  
In reference to the previous chapter, this chapter also begins by introducing the imagery that 
represents the modernist understanding of ethics, namely „manufacturing morality‟. 
Following this introduction, the next three sub-sections unpack the fundamentals of 
modernist ethics, as well as the implications thereof.  
The first sub-section investigates the motivation and method of dealing with moral dilemmas, 
through the imagery of „an engineering ethics‟. The second sub-section explores how 
modernist ethics confronts the contingency of difference in an ethical context, through the 
imagery of „an electioneering ethics‟. The final sub-section, through the imagery of „an 
evasion of ethics‟, supports the critique of the previous two sub-sections with a follow-up 
critique on the implication of its corrupt notion of moral responsibility.   
The chapter concludes by reflecting on modernist ethics‟ influence in the context of food 
systems, and based on the critique provided, concentrates on how this understanding affects 
the ethical approach of academia‟s involvement in food systems, and the implications thereof 
in realising sustainable food systems. 
Chapter Four: 
Part 2 opens with Chapter Four, which aims to imagine an alternative paradigm of thought 
that will more appropriately guide scientific thinking and academic inquiries in sustainability 
transitions, namely the „mountain mind‟. This chapter consists of five sections and sub-
sections that, together, provide a systematic introduction to a complex way of thinking.  
The chapter begins by introducing the imagery that represents a complex way of thinking, 
namely „thinking like a mountain‟. From this introduction, the next three sub-sections shed 
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light on the fundamental principles of this complex way of thinking, as well as the 
implications thereof.  
The first sub-section introduces the revolutionary structure and rationale of this complex 
thought, through the imagery of „a renaissance in reductionism and onwards‟. The second 
sub-section explores how this way of thinking embraces the contingency of difference, 
through the imagery of „binding binaries and beyond‟. The last sub-section of the chapter 
presents the inherently ethical element of this paradigm, through the imagery of „the 
mountain mind in modesty‟, complimenting the implications of the previous two sub-sections 
by commenting on the necessary attitude of modesty. 
The chapter ends with a reflection of this paradigm of complex thought‟s approach to the 
food systems context, and based on the introduction provided, presents how this way of 
thinking opens up the possibility of potentially realising sustainable food systems in 
sustainability transitions. 
Chapter Five: 
This chapter follows on from the insight provided by the previous chapter, so as to offer an 
alternative way of thinking about ethics in sustainability transitions, namely an „emerging 
ethics‟. Similar to the previous chapter‟s structure, this chapter consists of five sections and 
sub-sections that demonstrate the appropriateness of understanding ethics from a perspective 
of complexity.  
In reference to the previous chapter, this chapter also introduces the imagery that represents a 
complex understanding of ethics, namely „practising provisionality‟. Following this 
introduction, the next three sub-sections unpack the fundamentals of a complex ethics, as 
well as the implications thereof.  
The first sub-section introduces the incentive and strategy of addressing ethical complexity, 
through the imagery of „a renaissance in responsibility‟. The second sub-section explores 
how a complex understanding of ethics revels in the contingency of difference in an ethical 
context, through the imagery of „collaborative conversations and to be continued‟. The final 
sub-section, through the imagery of „an emerging ethics in earnest‟, supports the implications 
of the previous two sub-sections by commenting on how the continuous commitment of 
„practising provisionality‟ should be regarded as a process of social learning.  
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The chapter ends with a reflection on a complex understanding of ethics‟ approach to the 
food systems context, and based on the introduction provided, presents how this way of 
thinking about ethics would be appropriate in addressing the ethical complexity of realising 
sustainable food systems in sustainability transitions. 
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Part 1: The Machine Mind and an Engineered Ethics   
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Chapter 2: The Machine Mind – a Critical Reflection on Modernist Thinking 
2.1: Chapter Overview 
In short, this chapter presents a critique on the paradigm of thought that dominates current 
scientific thinking and academic inquiries. As a conceptual analysis of the underlying 
structure of this way of thinking, this chapter will demonstrate the inadequacy of this 
paradigm of thought and its avoidance of complexity, and in doing so, argues that an 
appropriate way of thinking about sustainability transitions would have to deal with the 
importance of acknowledging complexity. 
The first section will briefly introduce the imagery that represents this way of thinking‟s 
disregard of complexity, namely „thinking like a machine‟. Afterwards, the next three sub-
sections will elaborate on its fundamentals and the implications thereof.  
Firstly, through the imagery of „making machines out of mountains‟, the ontological and 
epistemological structure of this way of thinking will be introduced, which will identify this 
paradigm‟s ignorance with regard to acknowledging complexity. Secondly, through the 
imagery of „making divisions out of differences‟, is the exploration of how this way of 
thinking deals with the contingency of difference, and interacts with other ways of thinking. 
Thirdly, through the imagery of „taking the mountain out of the mountain range‟, this sub-
section complements the previous two sub-sections with a critique on the implications 
thereof, focusing mainly on this paradigm of thought‟s disregard for the complex nature of 
context.  
The final section of this chapter is a contextualised reflection of this paradigm of thought, 
with regard to food systems, and focuses on this way of thinking‟s effect on academia‟s 
interest in realising sustainable food systems.  
2.2: Thinking like a Machine 
The modern age has largely been dominated by a certain way of thinking about the world and 
framed how we study our relation to the world. From René Descartes to Isaac Newton, and 
subsequently throughout the history of traditional scientific paradigms, modernist rationality 
has long been regarded “as the foundation for science as a whole” (Heylighen et al., 
2007:118). Given the strictly mechanistic character in its ontological and epistemological 
manifestations, this rationality can be called „thinking like a machine‟.   
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The imagery of „thinking like a machine‟ is a common representation of a way of thinking 
that disregards the complex nature of phenomena and the complex contexts in which we 
study this subject matter (Morgan, 2006). This is evident in modernist rationality‟s belief that 
the world is a simple object that can be easily studied by reducing it to simple and isolated 
parts, like studying the parts of a machine.  Following this logic and applying it to the notion 
of rationality implies that our system of thought also works similar to an uncomplicated 
machine, through the inputs of sense perception and the outputs of knowledge claims. 
Subsequently, this supports the mechanical lens of linear observation from which this 
paradigm of thought studies the world. However, the world is complex – it is beautifully 
messy. It is what Swimme and Berry (1992:243) refer to as “a communion of subjects rather 
than a collection of objects. Undisputedly, our survival depends on creatively understanding 
this beauty – a space that has long been dismissed and excluded by the mechanistic position 
of the modern age. In this light, this way of thinking is inappropriate in dealing with the 
complex issues of sustainability transitions, like food security.  
There is, therefore, an immediate need to rethink this thinking that dominates traditional 
academic inquiries, and to accept and integrate this complexity into these research studies. Of 
course, this stands in contrast to the confidence of scientific thinking that has influenced the 
Western world, and in many cases through constructive influence. However, this is no cause 
for alarm, unless we choose to remain „thinking like a machine‟.  
2.2.1: Making Machines out of Mountains 
Unpacking this paradigm of thought is not complicated, although “its implications are subtle” 
(Heylighen et al., 2007:118). Therefore, it will be necessary to reflect on this thinking, so as 
to understand its benefits and its limits in a suitable approach to the world. Indeed, it is 
through reflecting on these foundational implications that an informed critique on the 
inappropriateness for our modernist understanding of ethics can be built, which will be 
elaborated on in the next chapter.  
The rationality that has characterised our modern age “emerged out of the discovery that 
human order is vulnerable, contingent and devoid of reliable foundations” (Bauman, 
1992:xi). However, instead of accepting its humbling experience, this discovery was 
immediately countered with a desperate attempt to control the contingency and „restore 
order‟. Firstly, it is important to acknowledge that, whilst human order is, indeed, susceptible 
to the contingencies of nature, the „outside‟ world is, of course, also vulnerable to its own 
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effects. There is a relentless display of death and destruction, unlike the romantic idealism of 
the world as a well-oiled machine. As such, “there is no such thing as „nature‟s balance‟, no 
real or primordial nature that would be in equilibrium if only humans had not intruded” 
(Urry, 2005:6). It is, therefore, a fallacy to believe that we can somehow „restore order‟. 
Nevertheless, this does already provide some insight into the attitude of modernist thinking. 
In order to address the vulnerability of our position, modernist thinkers have employed a 
method of simplification known as „reductionism‟, in which it is desperately sought “to gain 
complete understanding and mastery of a phenomenon by breaking it down into its 
component parts” (Harding, 2006:31). Its influence has been so extensive that it has been 
championed for centuries, and has shaped a mechanistic “perception of nature, of the human 
organism, [and] of society” (Capra, 2002:102). Modernist thinking‟s strict dependency on 
reductionism depends on three basic principles of “determinism, materialism and objective 
knowledge” (Heylighen et al., 2007:120). Indeed, by isolating our studies to a phenomenon‟s 
parts, and the parts of those parts, one is forced to employ a way of thinking that “reduces all 
phenomena to movements of independent, material particles governed by deterministic laws 
... [and] holds the promise of complete, objective and certain knowledge of past and future” 
(Heylighen et al., 2007:131). The system is reduced to its parts, like reducing a mountain to a 
machine. 
Of course, it is not necessarily reductionism that is at fault, but the modernist way of thinking 
that has a complete reliance and belief that these principles are sufficient in providing 
objective knowledge about the world – a strict reductionism. Admittedly, there may be 
groups of phenomena that are just large enough and just small enough to satisfy this reliance, 
but “between these two extremes, however, lies a third group of phenomena that are too 
diverse for analysis and too structured to be random” (Clayton & Radcliffe, 1996:16). In this 
case, this rationality is ineffective and often harmful. As such, this thesis argues that, from 
this paradigm, reductionism is both the method and the goal. The ontological questions and 
the epistemological questions of „thinking like a machine‟ are reliant on each other; even 
though this is in contradiction to the traditional understanding that questions of what exists 
and questions of how do we know what exists are separated fields of philosophy (Heylighen et 
al., 2007). In other words, a modernist approach can only overcome contingency through 
order if it is working with things that are controllable. And so, as academia is guided by the 
desire to control everything around us, it continues along a linear “obsession to find one 
essential truth” (Cilliers, 1998:112).  
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This motivation of rampant reductionism is theoretically supported by the modernist idea that 
“human agency is founded upon the idea of an a priori core self, capable of undertaking 
rational and causal actions, and thereby of being in control of itself and of the environment” 
(Woermann, 2013:9). So, not only are we competent enough to access apparently absolute 
truths that are somehow „out there‟ waiting to be uncovered, but because of this distancing, 
we also have no need to include ourselves, as components, in the equations of our studies. As 
such, from the perspective of modernist academia, it is presumed that research strategies “are 
value-free and fixed entities, leaving the subject-object divide uncontested” (Audouin et al., 
2013). In this light, the separations of philosophical questions exist not only in ontology and 
epistemology, but also with regard to ethics, since it is these marginalised questions of 
philosophical meaning and values that are “usually considered to be outside the scope of 
science” (Heylighen et al., 2007:117). And so, its rule over science has been unchecked and 
unaware of its “potentialities of destruction and of manipulation” (Morin, 2007:21).  
The commanding position of superiority that reductionism enjoys already raises very 
poignant questions about the exclusive applicability of such a paradigm, especially of one 
that is centuries old. This thesis argues that „thinking like a machine‟ has had its chapters in 
the story of human inquiries, and that, perhaps, it is high time that academia begins to 
reformulate its endeavours on foundations that are more suitable to our current context. 
Nevertheless, the strictly reductionist mindset still sees simple, separated components in 
contexts, and so, we continue “a monologue ... based on epistemologies of domination and 
control” (Blewitt, 2008:37) – we continue „thinking like a machine‟ – and as a result, we fail 
to understand the intricate nature of our socioecological systems and the problems with which 
they are now defined. This spells disaster for our sustainability efforts and sustainability 
transitions as a whole, since “an isolated, stand-alone issue is likely to result in ... unintended 
consequences and inefficiency” (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:218). Indeed, to echo the 
introduction, as “the different economic, social, technological and ecological systems that we 
are part of become ever more interdependent ... the result is an ever more complex „system of 
systems‟ where a change in any component may affect virtually any other component, and 
that in a mostly unpredictable manner” (Heylighen et al., 2007:117).  
The very real dangers and stresses of the many global polycrises that threaten life on Earth, 
therefore, challenge academia to seriously reflect on its role in this situation. However, 
because of the continued dominance of this „machine mind‟ paradigm, there has been 
insufficient attention paid to the possibility that the very way we think about the world could 
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be at the root of many of these crises. Indeed, even though “our way of doing science in the 
West has inadvertently contributed to the many problems we face” (Harding, 2006:15), much 
of Western academia continue with this way of thinking that detrimentally disregards the 
nature of socioecological systems. As such, it is imperative to acknowledge that this way of 
thinking still stubbornly lingers, and that the centuries-old war on Nature continues, 
perceiving her as “no more than a dead machine to be exploited as we wish for our own 
benefit, without let or hindrance” (Harding, 2006:19).  
This is not to say that the philosophical principles that define the modern age have no place in 
solving our global issues – far from it. The point is, rather, that the fixated and frigid 
structures of the current paradigm of thought do not give adequate recognition to the 
importance of contingent contexts in approaching complex systems, and thus do not allow for 
the appropriate usage of these philosophical tools. Ultimately, there will be certain aspects of 
this way of thinking that will remain useful to academia, but for now “we need to be prepared 
to question every single aspect of the old paradigm” (Capra, 1996:8). So, as the complex 
nature of our problems slowly come to light, this thesis argues that, at the same time, it is 
necessary to also question the dominance of this mechanistic perspective, which has 
neglected to acknowledge this very complexity.  
From this self-assuring position of supposed objectivity, scientific thinking is supposedly 
supplied with the control to „restore order‟, and as such, continues to dangerously deny that 
we are dealing with complexity. This desire continues to captivate the minds of our current 
leaders, entrenching a certain way of thinking about the world and how we relate to it. 
Whether it be desperation or a dream of order, this stubbornness has resulted in “nothing less 
than our imprisonment” (Cilliers, 1998:138), and only by understanding what it means to be 
„in jail‟ can academic inquiries begin to reflect on the responsibility of acknowledging 
complexity. 
2.2.2: Making Divisions out of Differences 
Strictly reductionist strategies of inquiry cannot avoid the contingencies it desperately tries to 
deny. Subsequently, the beautifully messy nature of complex phenomena are in direct 
confrontation with the modern dream of order, which does not allow any irregularities or 
imperfections “to exist, let alone claim legitimacy” (Bauman, 1992:xii). To manage the 
messiness of complexity, the „machine mind‟ employs what this study will refer to as a 
„conservative‟ binary logic that is geared to sort out the contingency and irreducibility of 
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complexity. This binary logic is a continuation with compartmentalisation that has become 
foundational to „thinking like a machine‟. 
To ensure order, a conservative binary logic entails formalising some things that „fall outside 
the bracket‟, but also denying that which emerges from the “grey area of ambivalence, 
indeterminacy and undecidability” (Bauman, 1992:xvi). This hierarchical way in which the 
mess is managed is evident in the pervasive dualistic ordering “of subject/object, 
mind/matter, nature/society, and so on – that dominates modern thinking” (Mebratu, 
1998:512). Thinking in terms of hierarchy is itself not the problem, per se, but rather how this 
hierarchy is manipulated –as divisions rather than differences. Cilliers (2001:144) says that 
whilst the hierarchical ordering of differences is necessary to create meaning, “as the context 
changes, so must the hierarchies”. For example, hierarchical thinking is necessary “for 
classifying data, comparing information, and organizing material” (Warren, 1998:258), but 
when one thing is subjected to an oppressive and unchanging relationship, it is detrimental to 
both the thing and the system in which it exists.  
According to the work of Derrida (1981:41), this is what we are dealing with in traditional 
philosophy, whereby “we have not a peaceful coexistence of facing terms but a violent 
hierarchy ... [where] one of the terms dominates the other”.  As Ernst Friedrich Schumacher 
(1973:13-14) is remembered for saying, “modern man talks of the battle with nature, 
forgetting that if he ever won the battle he would find himself on the losing side”. However, 
this so-called „battleground‟ of Earth is a shared space, and there cannot be a commitment to 
such a battle. So, where reductionism‟s formalisation is somewhat generous, there still 
remains a problematic desire to order differences in boxes and then set them up against each 
other. And so, whether formalised or denied, these things are both subjected to a hierarchy of 
domination. This logic should, therefore, be interpreted as exclusionary, not inclusionary, as 
it is an acknowledgement of divisions, not of differences.  
It is an unreflective alignment to strict reductionism, of believing objective knowledge to be 
at the end of an equation of components, which makes our minds “harden into inﬂexible and 
polarized oppositions” (Mebratu, 1998:512). These theoretical dichotomies are clearly 
present in academia – a place where human survival invests much of its hope, with regard to 
guiding us through sustainability transitions. Our modern knowledge is commonly set up 
against these kinds of opposing backdrops: science versus religion; West versus East; top-
down versus bottom-up; quality versus quantity; and even sustainability versus development. 
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The strictly reductionist method of the „machine mind‟ has, therefore, also reduced what can 
fundamentally be called knowledge; “it has become the bearer of death” (Morin & Kern, 
1999:128). However, these polarities are only a product of reduction, not of reality. Such a 
rationalisation overlooks the historic ties and interdependence of any academic issue, and 
makes competing armies out of its parts. Subsequently, this paradigm of thought not only 
fools itself into thinking that “can entirely contain all knowledge within its own fields” 
(Nicolescu, 2002:33), but it also encourages a behaviour of ruthless rivalry.  
Instead of solving the world‟s problems, we are left with leading thinkers in competition, not 
in collaboration, and academic departmentalisation that “has been significant for the 
maintenance of disciplinary autonomies, for the competition of research funds, and for the 
consolidation of academic prestige” (Max-Neef, 2005:6). The conservative binary logic of 
strict reductionism, therefore, obligates scientists to pursue their goal within a specific 
scientific paradigm, and this “implies a willingness to try and extend the explanatory power 
of that paradigm” (Emmeche, 2004:21). Pertinent issues, as a result, are considered only as a 
stage to belittle opposing camps.  
Obviously, at a time when ecological collapse is just around the corner, when economies are 
stuck in recessionary ruts, and when societies are in disunity and disarray, this is not an 
acceptable approach from academia. However, we need to understand that this “mutilated 
thinking and blind intelligence ... is not rational, but rationalizing” (Morin & Kern, 
1999:129). As elaborated on by Cilliers (2003:8), what is claimed to be objectively superior 
seems “less to do with rationality and more with power”.  Nevertheless, this thesis argues 
that, if we are able to acknowledge that our academic inquiries need to account for their 
enabling role in sustainability transitions, we can move forward to rethink the ways of 
thinking that dominate academic inquiry. 
This presents one of the biggest challenges for scientific research in the context of 
sustainability transitions – how do we work together? Interdisciplinarity, as well as the 
movement towards transdisciplinarity, should help in understanding complex sustainability 
challenges more contextually, and allow for a more appropriate approach. Yet, as long as 
academia remains blissfully unaware in this paradigm of thought – and remains „in jail‟ – 
“the possibility of thinking and the right to think are denied by the very disciplinary 
organization of scientific knowledge” (Morin & Kern, 1999:125). 
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2.2.3: Taking the Mountain out of the Mountain Range 
Of course, a myriad of medical discoveries and technological inventions can be traced back 
to principles of reductionism. However, it is difficult to disagree with the fact that “the 
amazement we feel in contemplating these wonders of industrial and informational 
technologies is tinged by a sense of uneasiness, if not outright discomfort” (Capra, 2002:98). 
This is because, on its own, a method “that is based on analysis, isolation and the gathering of 
complete information about a phenomenon” (Heylighen et al., 2007:117) is unable to 
acknowledge the complexities of socioecological dynamics.  
Society runs like clockwork according to the assumptions of deterministic simplification. 
Under the lens of reductionism, even the hands of the clock are undisputedly accurate, 
because time – like all phenomena – is, apparently, something “infinitely divisible into space-
like units, measurable in length, expressible as a number and reversible” (Urry, 2005:4). Yet, 
a deeply honest investigation into what we hold dear reveals that, rather than isolated, “all of 
the properties that matter to us in everyday life, such as beauty, life, status, intelligence ... 
turn out to be emergent” (Heylighen et al., 2007:121). Once things are separated into 
components, however, this insightful understanding is dismissed, as is the importance of how 
their contexts create their meaning – changing contexts change hierarchies, and thus change 
meaning (Cilliers, 2001). After all, even “a minimum of knowledge about knowledge teaches 
us that the most important factor is contextualization” (Morin & Kern, 1999:123). The 
problem, therefore, lies in the fact that „thinking like a machine‟ can only be “applied with 
success to static systems with interchangeable parts” (Hattingh, 1999:72). Again, the 
ontological-epistemological link can be acknowledged, in that how the socioecological 
systems of our studies are approached determines that what is seen is devoid of contextual 
significance. 
When scientific thinking engineers knowledge, there is no space for context in our equations. 
The one-dimensionality of this way of thinking has, therefore, “led us to underestimate or 
simply be blind to system effects even when they are upon us” (Blewitt, 2008:43). It is this 
insistence on converting research experience “into numbers or abstractions as quickly as 
possible ... [that] marginalises the phenomenon, and inhibits the possibility of the perception 
of depth and intrinsic value in the thing being studied” (Harding, 2006:31). And so, it is this 
blind faith in this way of thinking that has detrimentally excluded other avenues of 
understanding; “the fascination produced by reason has been so immense, that we have lost 
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other faculties and sentiments that facilitated ... our understanding of Nature from within” 
(Max-Neef, 2005:10). Subsequently, this thesis stresses the importance of acknowledging 
that the foundations of much of Western academic knowledge are built on sand, not stone – 
explanations that attribute all success to a method of strict reductionism will always be 
insufficient. Indeed, “innovators in all fields, whether in the sciences or not, often rely on 
intuition ... [but] when they share with, or exhibit their results to, colleagues, the tendency is 
to reduce their expressed findings to reductionist and rational approximations” (Max-Neef, 
2005:10-11). This has unfortunately left academic inquiries with mentalities that are “the 
most urgent problems and the ones most difficult to resolve” (Morin & Kern, 1999:128). 
Moreover, this has trickled over into the public sphere, as we “demand clear and direct 
answers, actions and solutions, but life, and science, is not like that” (Blewitt, 2008:43).  
This avoidance of acknowledging context and its importance to knowledge formation is also 
an avoidance of subjectivity and its importance. As said by Morin (2007:21), academia has 
respectfully “developed extremely sophisticated means to know external objects, but no 
means to know themselves”. As such, this study argues that this lacking understanding of 
context is, therefore, an empty understanding of ourselves, and this “is the price we pay for 
objective knowledge” (Nicolescu 2002:13). The result is that, in their research, scientists‟ 
“ethical, political and value judgements are plainly excluded or left along the road” (Max-
Neef, 2005:8). However, it is not that those judgements are not there, it is simply that “the 
conceptual underpinning and empirical evidence base for perspectives and approaches ... are 
often more implicit than explicit” (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:218). This has allowed 
scientific thinking to extend the fallacy with which it has long fooled itself and the world – 
that the facts at the end of our equations are value-free. In reality, however, these “facts 
emerge out of an entire constellation of human perception, values, and actions – in one word, 
out of a paradigm” (Capra, 1996:11). So long as those committed to sustainability transitions 
see themselves as epitomised by the „centred self‟ – “the idea of an a priori core self ... 
[which] presumes that we are fully transparent to ourselves” (Woermann, 2013:9) – the 
successes of these inquiries will always be tainted by this exclusion of our subjective input.  
In terms of addressing our global polycrises, these strictly reductionist tools of isolation 
“have long been used, with minimal success” (Gardner, 2003:175). Even more worrying is 
that they have, in some places, worsened the crises. Nevertheless, it has been proudly 
professed, in confidence or arrogance, that the method of strict reductionism will “sooner or 
later overcome all remaining obstacles” (Heylighen et al., 2007:121). Therefore, in ignorance, 
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inquiries into sustainability transitions carry on with the same thinking that has largely been 
the cause of these predicaments, and expect new solutions; as if the owls of Minerva would 
be better off as aeroplanes. This dangerously deep-rooted oversimplification is what is 
referred to as “the rationalizing idea of guaranteed progress” (Morin & Kern, 1999:129). 
However, like Werner Heisenberg (1958) has said already, “what we observe is not nature 
herself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning”. Academic inquiries must, 
therefore, accept the realisation that when phenomena are studied out of their context, like 
studying a mountain in isolation from its mountain range context, only an inadequate 
understanding is achieved.  
In its dream for order, „thinking like a machine‟ has denied contradictions and absurdities. 
But, the irony is that this paradigm‟s overload of reductionism is what is truly contradictory 
and absurd. In the attempt to reduce objects into knowable parts, the defining context has 
been excluded, which renders a „complete‟ understanding impossible. So, when this 
modernist paradigm of thought went “to fish for order in the sea of nature ... it caught no fish 
– only fishbones” (Morin, 1992:383). This thesis argues, therefore, that objectivity under the 
lens of strict reductionism is only an out-of-context and reduced objectivity.  
2.3: Thinking like a Machine in the Context of Food Systems 
Understanding the implications of our dominant paradigm of thought is critical to providing a 
more appropriate foundation from which complexity can be acknowledged in academic 
thinking. This is especially relevant when the global polycrises are considered, and that there 
is a need to guide inquiries through sustainability transitions. Therefore, to provide a deeper 
understanding of the „machine mind‟, it will be helpful to contextualise „thinking like a 
machine‟ in our commitment to realising sustainable food systems. 
When we are „thinking like a machine‟ in the context of food systems, it is believed that the 
employment of strict reductionism will grant us the objective knowledge that will ultimately 
be the key to „feeding the world‟. This linear thinking, which simply equates a sustainable 
food system to a system that increases food production, is what is called the „production 
paradigm‟ (Chrispeels & Mandoli, 2003). Indeed, modernist approaches to food system 
issues “find expression in strategies of analysis that isolate system components in the study 
process” (Audouin et al., 2013); compartmentalising agricultural land into managed blocks, 
so as to deterministically achieve food production – to engineer what we eat.  
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There is no question that, in order to „feed the world‟, food systems will have to efficiently 
produce crops to meet ever-growing demands. However, even though the emphasis has been 
on production, there has been “slow progress in reducing hunger in past decades ... [and] the 
number of undernourished people in developing countries actually increased from 823 
million in 1990 to 923 million in 2007” (von Braun, 2009:9). This thesis argues that the 
reason for this can be ascribed to the one-dimensionality of the ‟production paradigm‟, which 
neglects the contextual complexity of food production, with devastating trade-offs in food 
nutrition and the integrity of our natural resources. The aim of sustainable food systems is, of 
course, to interrogate and reconceptualise the food security challenge (Drimie & McLachlan, 
2013), but this challenge goes beyond quantity. Indeed, a sufficiency of food is one of the 
cornerstones of food security, but it must also represent a contextualised, equitable food 
system “where malnutrition is absent, and where food originates from efficient, effective, and 
low-cost food systems that are compatible with sustainable use of natural resources” (IFPRI, 
1995:1). 
However, in this modernist rationality‟s arrogant self-confidence, it is thoughtlessly 
advocated that an industrialised, chemical-intensive agriculture will suffice, which is only 
streamlined to maximise production. Ironically, this wrecks the fertility of the very resource 
food production depends on – soil. Scherr (2000:479) warns that this reckless disregard for 
context could lead to “a downward spiral”, whereby those involved in the food system run the 
risk of further impoverishing and endangering the very communities they try and „save‟ with 
their production methods. However, it would be as foolish to completely throw out the input 
of chemicals and pesticides, and so, a more frugal approach would be more conscious of the 
sensitivity of food systems context. As suggested by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (1995:33), “past and current failures to replenish soils with the nutrients removed 
must be rectified through the balanced and efficient use of plant nutrients from both organic 
and inorganic sources”. 
Nevertheless, not only is there a strict obedience to the „production paradigm‟, but when 
„thinking like a machine‟, the academic influence in food systems has sought to ensure its 
position of objectivity by rejecting any contrasting claims. This has stagnated the necessary 
scientific progress that could emerge from academic dialogue, and has deepened “divisions 
amongst the „producers‟ of scientific knowledge and between the „users‟ of this and other 
forms of knowledge” (Burns, Audouin & Weaver, 2006:379). Of course, we must be 
reminded that the oversimplificaion of exclusive, disciplinary approaches “makes rational 
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discourse among stakeholders from different disciplines, sectors and levels difficult, and 
prevents them from working together effectively to find innovative ways to respond to food 
security challenges” (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:218). However, the complexity of food 
systems challenges are such that they “cannot be understood and addressed using mono-
disciplinary approaches only” (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:219), and as such, the hope of 
realising a sustainable food system is always threatened by this „violent‟ academic hierarchy.  
In recalling what was said by Cilliers (2003:8), this kind of setting for an academic 
knowledge has “less to do with rationality and more with power”. This is evident in 
academia‟s efforts to „feed the world‟, as witnessed in the shockingly widespread abuse of 
power displayed by editors of scientific journals; like that of the Food and Chemical 
Toxicology journal‟s Richard Goodman, a former Monsanto employee, whose recent “fast-
tracked appointment, directly onto the upper editorial board raises urgent questions” 
(Robinson & Latham, 2013). This appointment occurred after a study (Séralini et al., 2012) 
linked Monsanto – a giant corporation in industrial agriculture – to dangerous health risks. 
The result of this was to regulate the debate and the information with articles that criticised 
and discounted the study against Monsanto. More worrying, however, is that many of these 
criticisms were made with implicit values not made explicit. For example, some of the 
strongest criticisms came from Paul Christou, who has vested interests in Monsanto‟s success 
– he is an inventor of some of their genetically-modified crop patents – and who published 
his responses in the Transgenic Research journal, of which he is editor-in-chief (Robinson & 
Latham, 2013). This thesis emphasises, therefore, that any attempt to control academia and 
knowledge itself “is not merely a technical or descriptive error, it is unethical” (Cilliers, 
2004:23). 
In light of this reflection on how „thinking like a machine‟ influences how the context of food 
systems and the issue of food security are understood, this study acknowledges the 
inappropriateness of the „machine mind‟ paradigm in realising sustainable food systems. The 
employment of strict reductionism has meant that the complexity of food system challenges 
is disregarded, and as such, that only fast-tracked food production is underscored, which this 
study believes is insufficient. This avoidance of acknowledging the complex context of 
sustainability transitions will mean that the modernist mission to „feed the world‟ will not 
only fail, but in its failings will also risk the stability and integrity of ecological systems.  
Furthermore, a conservative binary logic, which seeks to ensure „order‟ from a position of 
objectivity, has meant that any debate has been met with hostility, and as such, there is 
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clearly “no room for flexible adaptations, learning, and evolution in the machine metaphor” 
(Capra, 2002:105). Indeed, this modernist rationality‟s possibilities for social learning to take 
place are too limited to satisfy our necessary scientific will, as these “narrowly disciplinary or 
academic modes of research or learning – and attempts to integrate such learning – cannot 
deal adequately with the challenges of food insecurity” (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:219). 
This is shameful, since we are in a time of transition that we have never experienced before, 
and there exists no scientific high-ground to guide us successfully towards sustainable food 
systems.  
Whilst the „machine mind‟ can be argued to be implicitly unethical, it is still important to ask 
how this paradigm of thought explicitly answers the philosophical questions of what it means 
to be ethical. This will not only provide this thesis with more insight into the „machine mind‟, 
but it will also provide a platform from which a more appropriate understanding of ethics in 
food systems can be argued. As such, it is, therefore, necessary to investigate how „thinking 
like a machine‟ influences a philosophical understanding of ethics.  
2.4: Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented a critique on the paradigm of thought that dominates traditional 
scientific thinking and academic inquiries. As a conceptual analysis of the underlying 
structure of this way of thinking, this chapter has provided the necessary space from which its 
understanding of ethics can be investigated.  
The first section introduced the imagery that represents this way of thinking‟s disregard for 
complexity, namely „thinking like a machine‟. Afterwards, three sub-sections were 
introduced, which elaborate on its fundamentals and the implications thereof.  
Firstly, through the imagery of „making machines out of mountains‟, the ontological and 
epistemological structure of this way of thinking was introduced, which identified this 
paradigm‟s ignorance with regard to acknowledging complexity. Secondly, through the 
imagery of „making divisions out of differences‟, it was explored how this way of thinking 
deals with the contingency of difference, and the interaction with other ways of thinking. 
Thirdly, through the imagery of „taking the mountain out of the mountain range‟, the next 
sub-section complemented the previous two sub-sections with a critique on the implications 
thereof, focusing mainly on this paradigm of thought‟s disregard for the complex nature of 
context.  
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The final section of this chapter provided a contextualised reflection on this paradigm of 
thought, with regard to food systems, and focused on its effect on academia‟s interest in 
realising sustainable food systems.  
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Chapter 3: An Engineered Ethics – a Critical Reflection on Modernist Ethics 
3.1: Chapter Overview 
In short, this chapter elaborates on the previous chapter‟s critique, by investigating how the 
„machine mind‟ way of thinking approaches the question of ethics, and how this 
manifestation is inappropriate in the context of sustainability transitions. As a continuance of 
the conceptual analysis, this chapter will provide the necessary base from where a more 
appropriate way of thinking can be introduced that is more fitting in the context of 
sustainability transitions – from the lens of complexity. Thereafter, an alternative and 
contextualised understanding of ethics will be proposed.  
The first section will similarly present the imagery that demonstrates how this understanding 
of ethics disregards complexity, namely „manufacturing morality‟. Following this 
introduction, the next three sub-sections unpack the fundamentals and implications of such a 
modernist understanding of ethics.  
Firstly, the metaphor of „an engineering ethics‟ presents the motivation and method of 
dealing with moral dilemmas, elucidated in a continuation of ignorance towards complexity. 
Secondly, the metaphor of „an electioneering ethics‟ is used to investigate how modernist 
ethics confronts the contingency of difference in an ethical context. Thirdly, through the 
imagery of „an evasion of ethics‟, this sub-section supports the critique of the previous two 
sub-sections with a follow-up critique on the implications thereof, focusing on how modernist 
ethics offers an inadequate understanding of moral responsibility.  
The last section of this chapter is a contextual reflection on the modernist understanding of 
ethics with regard to food systems, and concentrates on how this understanding affects 
academic interest in realising sustainable food systems. 
3.2: Manufacturing Morality 
„Thinking like machine‟ has significantly shaped how we approach the world, making no 
exception of how ethics is understood. This way of thinking has mechanically instructed how 
we relate to the world, prescribing the understanding of ethics as a metaphysical engine of 
‟right and wrong‟. However, ethics is not an engine whose parts can be studies and applied 
objectively. There are no blueprints to ensure accurate ethical behaviour. The modern dream 
of order, therefore, remains just that: a dream.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
 
Through an approach of strict reductionism, which assumes that “all phenomena, whether 
physical, biological, mental or social, are ultimately constituted of matter” (Heylighen et al., 
2007:118), the dominant paradigm of thought aims at „manufacturing morality‟; looking to 
regulate social behaviour by means of moral rules. However, to try and control societal 
interactions is to try and do away with the ever-contingent dilemma of understanding what is 
„right‟ and what is „wrong‟. This attempt to overcome the contingency is, therefore, only 
successful in being “a noble ideal” (Cilliers, 1998:137). By „manufacturing morality‟, the 
richness and importance of ethics is reduced, and therefore, its approach to moral dilemmas is 
like that of an engineer to an automobile. Yet, its service is more like that of an engineer to an 
artwork, which only complicates something already so complex. As such, a modernist 
understanding of ethics will only continue to misuse and misunderstand something that says 
so much about what it means to be alive today. 
Having unpacked the underlying structures of the „machine mind‟ paradigm of thought in 
Chapter Two, this chapter will examine its influence and modernist grip on moral philosophy. 
A „machine mind‟ will always supply an „engineered ethics‟, and „thinking like a machine‟ 
will always result in „manufacturing morality‟. The strictly reductionist leanings that are 
employed in modern moral philosophy will, therefore, be demonstrated to be inadequate in 
understanding the complex nature of ethics in sustainability transitions. So, as we begin to 
rethink our paradigm of thought, we must also begin to rethink our engagement and decision-
making with regard to moral dilemmas.  
3.2.1: An Engineering of Ethics 
As a philosophical reflection on how we socially interact and express ourselves, ethics has 
been a contested topic for hundreds of years. As Socrates is remembered for noting, it 
concerns “no small matter, but how we ought to live” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:1). Its 
significance, however, can only be understood when it is realised that it is the moral choices 
that determine the difference between „how we live‟ and „how we ought to live‟. Yet, the 
dream of order has denied us the freedom of decision-making, with the aim of “controlling 
individual and interpersonal behaviour” (Clayton & Radcliffe, 1996:2-3). 
The belief of modernist ethics is that there are apparently a priori moral facts that exist and 
are discoverable from the supposed position of objectivity. Such an understanding assumes 
that moral dilemmas can be ordered and judged from an objective and neutral position. And 
so, in an attempt to crush the contingencies of moral dilemmas, modernist ethics aims to 
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satisfy these moral conundrums by arguing “for universal ethical principles, principles that 
would always apply to everybody” (Cilliers, 2004:20). The linear rationalising is that if these 
moral rules are followed, justice will be served, and by ensuring justice, so too is order 
ensured. It is the obedience to these moral rules, therefore, that allows modernist ethical 
theories to do away with the difficult decisions of a moral dilemma, thereby 
“decomplexifying it” (Morin, 2007:10). This is modernist ethic‟s simplistic way of 
differentiating between the „good‟ and „bad, and the „right‟ and „wrong‟ in the one-
dimensional journey of „how we ought to live‟.  
Subsequently, by separating ethical agents from their ethical engagements, the insistence of 
immovable moral rules continues “the modernist ideal of getting it exactly right” (Heylighen 
et al., 2007:130). And so, from the comfort of moral certainty, „manufacturing morality‟, 
therefore, can assume “that one‟s experiences or context have no effects on one‟s views of 
right or wrong” (Woermann, 2013:vii). The irony, however, is that “following a universal set 
of rules ... merely asks for calculation” (Cilliers, 1998:137), not choice. This shows no 
appreciation for the complexity of societal and socioecological relations and interactions, and 
thus hardly seems ethical at all. Moreover, to follow this faith in satisfying these apparently 
timeless moral facts is proof of a hypocritical position. After all, as Hattingh (1999:80) points 
out, the “ethics which recognise the rights of and dignity of persons, and which we accept as 
self-evident today ... gradually evolved to become a generally accepted and interwoven with 
the very fabric of our constantly evolving institutions, experiences and practices”. 
Nevertheless, the modernist understanding of ethics continues to belittle „how we ought to 
live‟ by enforcing a certain value over another – applying rules to difficult decisions and 
immediately expecting justice, like applying facecream to acne and immediately expecting 
smooth skin.  
If there were moral facts, as is argued by modernist ethicists, ethics would indeed just be a 
matter of right and wrong, no questions asked. This desire for an ethical equilibrium is what 
Woermann (2013:102) refers to as the desire for “an equalising justice or circular exchange 
between societal interest groups”. There would be no moral dilemmas and no moral 
decisions. According to the deterministic reasoning of modernist ethicists, this would result in 
a perfectly just society of obedient individuals – the dream of order realised. The insistence 
on simplification is, therefore, guilty of further instilling the idea that “being ethical is easy” 
(Woermann, 2013:160). Indeed, anyone who has really confronted the difficulty of a moral 
dilemma will know that “we cannot talk about justice in the social sphere without realising 
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that we are dealing with complex phenomena” (Cilliers, 2004:22). As such, it is argued by 
this thesis that a complete reliance on moral rules is an ignorant denial of complexity. 
Of course, there is certainly some honour in some order, but ethical theories can never go so 
far as to base moral rules on a priori moral facts, since things like values, meaning and 
justice are not things that “exist in the way that planets and trees and spoons exist” (Rachels 
& Rachels, 2007:44). They are not waiting at the end of an equation. Therefore, the inflexible 
employment of moral rules is, albeit with „noble‟ intentions, just another method of strict 
reductionism, which can only “result in the violation of something or someone that is not (or 
cannot) be considered of terms of that description” (Cilliers, 2004:23). Hattingh (1999:81) 
goes on to comment that, even if an a priori set of moral rules did exist, this would probably 
not realise the dream of order “given the manner in which the human mind actually makes 
decisions”. As such, modernist ethical theories neglect the complexity of both our moral 
dilemmas and our decision-making.  
The ever-approaching pandemonium of ecological ills, like food insecurity, resource 
depletion and climate change, has introduced the issue of inter-generational and intra-
generational justice to public discourse. Indeed, this thesis acknowledges that, for instance, 
“we cannot get very far in discussing why climate change is a problem without evoking 
ethical considerations ... then we appear to need some account of moral responsibility, 
morally important interests and what to do about both” (Gardiner, 2006:398). However, 
without an appreciation of the ethical complexity in these contexts, academic inquiries will 
never be able to critically reflect, and thereby “engage with the problem of justice in a 
philosophical way” (Cilliers, 2003:9). It is, therefore, argued in this study that, if food 
systems scientists are unable to introduce an appropriate understanding of ethics that accounts 
for complexity, they will risk the integrity of our social system, and thus skew its expectation 
of what inter-generational and intra-generational justice might mean. Moreover, this will also 
have disastrous consequences with regard to how these inquiries understand the 
socioecological interactions of the world, through a time of drastic and unpredictable change, 
as the implications of such a society will equate to an “action that threatens sustainability” 
(Hawken, 2007:187).  
By reducing the engagement with ethics to simply reporting on rules, the modernist influence 
in moral philosophy is thinning-out something so thick, and our academic inquiries are, 
therefore, not able to deeply reflect on the implications of their ethical actions and decisions. 
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As such, modernist ethics ignorantly avoids the complexity of social and socioecological 
interactions, and so is also unable to account for the ethical considerations of others. 
Nevertheless, modernist ethical theories are content in only „manufacturing morality‟, and 
ask only that individuals adhere “to the spirit and the letter of the law” (Chrispeels & 
Mandoli, 2003:4). Therefore, traditional scientific thinking navigates its way through these 
turbulent times on a shaky moral high-ground, rather than sharing common ground for ethical 
deliberation. 
3.2.2: An Electioneering of Ethics 
From the perspective of a modernist moral philosophy, ethics has been a matter of building 
ethical theories based on the strictly reductionist assumption that we live and interact in “a 
black-white world of good and evil” (Norton, 1991:viii). The self-assurance that comes with 
this paradigm means that there is no place for debate or diversity in a dominant ethical 
positioning. By „manufacturing morality‟, this thesis argues that the threat to appropriately 
understanding ethics is, therefore, further complicated by the competitive arrogance of an 
„engineered ethics‟.  
Of course, any understanding of ethics will acknowledge the importance of saying something 
about value theory – that moral choices are made up of choosing one value over another – 
“the two are, ultimately, inseparable” (Palmer, 2003:17). However, a value theory that 
commits to realising the dream of order cannot conform to “the nature of the inexistent” 
(Woermann, 2013:77). As such, the only order that is achieved is the ordering of winners and 
losers. In other words, when we are „manufacturing morality‟, it is the conservative binary 
logic of „thinking like a machine‟ that justifies submission to such a competitive 
electioneering of ethical theories (Warren, 1998). Modernist ethical theories, therefore, 
corrupt the innocence of value-hierarchical thinking, and keep certain values from our ethical 
decision-making, which deprives individuals from understanding the ethical position of the 
other actors in their moral dilemmas.  
This conservative binary logic is represented in the dominance of theories of obligation in 
modernist ethics, which exclusively emphasise “impersonal duty, contracts ... and the 
calculation of costs and benefits” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:171). Such is modernist ethics‟ 
monopoly on morality, whereby the primacy of obedience equates to an absence of choice. 
Of course, these values have their place – in the boardroom or on the battlefield, for example. 
However, by completely excluding care, compassion, tolerance and other values, such an 
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attempt at offering an all-encompassing understanding of ethical complexity is problematic. 
Indeed, these overly-masculine ethical theories “are notoriously ill-suited to describing life 
among family and friends” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:167). It is a degradation of something 
that is unique to human beings – the moral dilemma – and, as a result, degrading to ourselves. 
After all, these rules are only a product of „manufacturing morality‟ – a result of 
reductionism, not reality.  
Nevertheless, as contexts have changed over time, these theories have necessarily been 
questioned and criticized. The nature of thinking about „how we ought to live‟ means that the 
one-dimensionality of these modernist ethical theories cannot escape being compared with 
the complexity of real-life social interactions, and the effects thereof. After all, as said by 
Bryan Norton (1991:x), these polarised positions of moral authority “thrive only in ivory 
towers; when held up against the real world, they do not fit, and ... underneath, one usually 
finds a continuum with an oversimplification superimposed”. As such, when the moral 
measures of „how we ought to live‟ are discussed, the tendency is to “ricochet back and forth 
between apparently exclusive worldviews and sets of value assumptions” (Norton, 1991:9). 
This is ironic, once again, since the contingency of moral dilemmas that modernist ethical 
theory was trying to overcome has now become commonplace. The dream of order has 
become its own worst enemy, in that the certainty and supposedly solid foundations of 
modernist ethics have become splintered by ethical electioneering.  
The debate in modernist ethics, however, is not one of constructive communication, but of 
competition. This is because of the conservative binary logic that modernist ethicists still 
insist on when they approach the theory of „how we ought to live‟. The ignorance of not 
engaging in ethical deliberation demonstrates an arrogance “which is exactly insensitive to 
the ethical dimension involved when we deal with complexity” (Heylighen et al., 2007:130). 
As a result, ethical theories avoid looking for common ground to work together and try and 
understand the complexity of our moral dilemmas, and stay “highly confrontational and 
adversarial, and also inconclusively, since they quickly degenerate into ideological 
stalemates” (Hattingh, 1999:78-79). The continual conflict of ethical positions, therefore, 
adds to “the popular image that philosophers tend to talk to themselves, turning their backs on 
a world which hopes to gain from the insights they can bring” (Hattingh, 1999:71). The result 
of this is an appropriate engagement with ethics is further marginalised from academic 
inquiries, which only stresses that individual‟s values and ethical assumptions are of no 
concern when engaging in scientific research. As such, an „engineered ethics‟ only reinforces 
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the vicious cycle of strict reductionism, which is unethically stubborn in its “denial of 
creative change” (Heylighen et al., 2007:120). This is, indeed, something of which academia 
should be ashamed, and something which we urgently need to address. 
This is wholly misplaced in the context of sustainability, since the decisions that members of 
the public, academics, or anyone in society as a whole will have to make, will not be simple 
„either/or‟ choices, “but will involve choosing between options that have different benefits 
and costs, for different people at different times” (Clayton & Radcliffe, 1996:11). If academic 
research remains unreflective and inconsiderate, it cannot claim to be committed to the 
problems of sustainability transitions or food security in an ethical way, since only one group 
or argument will benefit from an unquestioned ethical framework, where one value rules over 
another. And so, without any critical communication and engagement with our seemingly 
incompatible ethical positions, these difficult decisions are “liable to remain blinkered and 
uninformed” (Blewitt, 2008:29). Furthermore, this is detrimental not only to the 
understanding the ethical complexities of the global polycrises, but also to the multilayered 
complexity of the contexts in which these crises emerge. After all, ethical contexts cannot be 
appreciated as something separate from ontological and epistemological contexts. 
The difficult decisions that moral dilemmas demand of ethical agents are only deepened by 
the walls that modern moral philosophy has put up between ethical positions. Indeed, this is 
further problematised by the fact that these „moral wars‟ are something that “academic and 
social commentary ... has accepted and even reinforced” (Norton, 1991:11). As long as 
scientists‟ engagement with ethics is as an attempt to impress a moral high-ground, it will 
never be able to understand the complexity of what it means to address „how we ought to 
live‟. Subsequently, researchers will also never appreciate the responsibility– and opportunity 
– of what it means to be alive today.   
3.2.3: An Evasion of Ethics   
If today‟s social and socioecological behaviour represents moral responsibility, then, at the 
very least, moral philosophy must rethink how „responsibility‟ is conceptualised. This thesis 
emphasises that this misunderstanding plays a large part in embedded poverty, class 
inequality, and food insecurity. So, in order to round-off this critique, this thesis must 
investigate where modernist ethics‟ understanding of moral responsibility stands in light of 
these tragedies. After all, “to the extent that they exist ... they‟re choices” (Chomsky, 
2012:63). 
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The fact that we can acknowledge that things such as ethics, moral order and moral rules do 
exist shows our appeal for displaying a certain socially acceptable and respectable behaviour. 
However, even with the extra considerations that come with the introduction of new 
technologies, new ideas and society‟s changing values, “few of us actively engage in an 
ethical analysis of our actions or can provide reasons for the choices we make” (Chrispeels & 
Mandoli, 2003:4). In fact, when ethics just becomes a matter of responding to rules, “in such 
circumstances, there is no responsible action” (Woermann, 2013:111). Of course, it is easy to 
blame the rules, but blame only has substance when the philosophical context thereof is 
understood. It is, therefore, not so much the ideal of moral rules that is at fault, but rather the 
modernist paradigm of thought that believes these rules to be immovable and based on moral 
facts. In a critical reflection of the expectations implied by an „engineered ethics‟, Cilliers 
(2004:20) says that “if one‟s understanding of ethics involves the combating of real, 
contingent injustices, one can argue that the modernist position is actually a way of 
circumventing ethical responsibility”. Is argued that the resulting behaviour is, therefore, far 
from the desire to „do good‟ that we strive for – it is, if anything, an evasion of that attempt at 
ethics.  
To honestly understand and encourage ethical behaviour, we have to appreciate the 
responsibility of our own moral decision-making. However, in an „engineered ethics‟, the 
responsibility of the calculative choices that are made in moral dilemmas are far removed 
from the actual choices themselves, since that responsibility has been moved to a 
metaphysical position, or a “supra-individual level” (Bauman, 1992:xxii). This works well for 
those who want to do away with the distress of dilemmas, and for those who want to direct 
our decisions, but to call this behaviour „responsible‟ seems contradictory to the appeal of 
„how we ought to live‟. It is, therefore, problematic to expect appropriate ethical action if 
ethics is thought of in a way that disregard the complexity of what it means to act 
responsibly. This is because “a transcendental notion of justice is useless in practice since we 
do not know what it is” (Cilliers, 2004:23). Indeed, this passivity offers only a “blind 
intelligence [that] fosters unconsciousness and irresponsibility” (Morin & Kern, 1999:128). 
Nevertheless, it is the conflicting and manipulative influence of „manufacturing morality‟ that 
still manages to dominate our interpretations of ethics, and thus our interpretation of 
responsibility. 
As seen in the morally questionable behaviour of society that is present today, “the effects of 
modernist ethics are unfortunately not confined to philosophical positions” (Cilliers, 
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2004:20). Modern systems of law, politics and economics go about their business in 
confidence that they are firmly on a moral high-ground, and this influence has had a „trickle 
down‟ effect, extending to the norms of our general societal behaviour. The responsibility of 
ethical action has, therefore, been replaced by what Stephen Gardiner (2006:408) calls the 
“manipulative or self-deceptive behaviour ... of moral corruption”. The implications of the 
stringent instructions have led to an overemphasis of values that are overly “self-assertive” 
(Capra, 1996:9-10), and which have clearly been inadequate in the context of a complex 
society and world. The influence of modernist ethics has seeped down to everyday 
interactions, the result being what has been referred to as the „neoliberal ideology‟;“to just 
take care of yourself and forget about anyone else” (Chomsky, 2012:73).  
Of course, when reducing mountains to machines, this behaviour is apparent in the 
unreflective and exploitive engagement with the Earth. However, whilst many individuals 
and economies have benefitted from this exploitation, much more cultures and populations 
have suffered because of our electioneering of these self-serving values. It might be thought 
that the West lives in the „civilised‟ world, but even in the most industrially developed of 
nations, this grossly impassionate and passive behaviour was all too commonplace not long 
ago, as both women and indigenous populations were regarded as second-class citizens 
(Chomsky, 2012). More heartbreakingly is that the bitterness of this behaviour still lingers in 
the dark corners of their communities, even when these rules have changed. Think of the 
injustices during apartheid – where white people were allowed to treat black people like sub-
humans “by uncritically remaining within the confines of law” (Cilliers, 2004:4) – and how 
those race relations still remain in a supposedly free and democratic South Africa. This puts 
in a dangerously unsuited position with regard to guiding society through sustainability 
transitions.  
To engage with the moral responsibility of ethical decision-making requires critical 
reflection. This thesis argues that it is necessary to slow down the chatter of the „machine 
mind‟ and open academia up to the depth of its ethical context. However, in today‟s “cult of 
speed” (Cilliers, 2006:108) there is never time for this. In an „engineered ethics‟, therefore, 
there is no reflection, only reaction. As such, “this move away from reflection to immediate 
response” (Cilliers, 2006:108) is an undignified and inappropriate approach to addressing 
something that says so much about what it means to be human. The denial and avoidance of 
ethical complexity is, therefore, a denial and avoidance of our humanity.  
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3.3: Manufacturing Morality in the Context of Food Systems 
It is important to reflect on the dominant understanding of ethics, so as to provide the 
necessary space from which a way of thinking about „how we ought to live‟ that 
acknowledges the complexity of our socioecological interactions can be introduced. 
However, given that this is something that requires a committed and academic mind, it is 
suggested that this critique of the modernist understanding of ethics in sustainability 
transitions is complemented by reflecting on this understanding in the context of the food 
system.  
When we are „manufacturing morality‟ in the context of food systems, it is believed that there 
are unquestionable and objective moral truths, from which the necessary ethical action to 
„feed the world‟ can be directed. Indeed, modernist food system ethics is claimed to have 
predominantly utilitarian roots, which adheres to the moral rule “that when evaluating an 
action we judge its outcome” (Chrispeels & Mandoli, 2003:5). As such, in this unreflective 
short-sightedness, there is a “moral confidence” (Chrispeels & Mandoli, 2003:4) that is 
expressed in the „duty‟ to maximise the production of food. So, as long as the „end‟ of 
increased yields is achieved, then any „means‟ is justified, and as such, this interpretation 
stays strictly within the modernist „production paradigm‟. For example: the industrialised 
farming of battery chickens; the heavy dosage of pesticides and herbicides to keep food from 
naturally decomposing; the genetic engineering of foods to appeal to aesthetics; and the 
destruction of biodiverse rainforests to plant soy or make grazing land for cattle that will feed 
the unhealthy diets of the West (Battersby & McLachlan, 2013).  
Of course, it is important to emphasise the consequences of our actions, and there is a moral 
integrity in „feeding the world‟. However, as argued earlier, a sustainable food system will 
have to represent more than just an increase in food production. It is, therefore, ethically 
unsound in thinking that moral responsibility is simply to maximise output. Moreover, this 
ethical position assumes an objective knowledge of future effects and influences, which is 
insufficient in addressing the uncertainty and ever-changing contexts of sustainability 
transitions. There is no contextual acknowledgement of how different our moral 
considerations and moral responsibility would have to adapt with regard to the food systems‟ 
“rapidly changing context that involves both „long wave stresses‟ such as climate change, and 
„short wave shocks‟ such as food price volatility” (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:218).  
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However, many individuals and organisations involved in the study of the food system still 
believe themselves to be acting from a moral high-ground. According to agriculturalist 
ethicist Paul Thompson (1998:13), proponents of the „production paradigm‟ may well “have 
been seduced into thinking that so long as they increased food availability, they were exempt 
from the constant process of politically negotiating and renegotiating the moral bargain that is 
at the foundations of the modern democratic society”. Indeed, as told by author Robert 
Zimdahl (2002:46), those who adhere to this way of thinking about understanding ethics in 
food systems, “have not taken the time to articulate any value position other than the value of 
production”. Therefore, due to the arrogance of „manufacturing morality‟, those committed to 
food security are, nevertheless, incapable of engaging ethically in issues of food systems. 
Any progress towards realising sustainable food systems is “characterized by political 
stalemate” (Henry, 2009:131), and as a result, our understanding of the wider complexity 
thereof is reduced. 
As an example of this, we need only recall the earlier controversy, which linked Monsanto 
products to serious health concerns (Séralini et al., 2012). Since the study‟s publication in the 
Food and Chemical Toxicology journal, there have been numerous criticisms that point out 
its apparent “breaches of ethical standards” (Robinson & Latham, 2013). According to these 
advocates of genetic engineering, there was an unquestionable ethical line that the academics 
had crossed. This should reveal how such an argument is reminiscent of „manufacturing 
morality‟, in that the critique appealed to transcendental moral standards. Of course, the point 
here is not to try and justify the ethics of the study, but rather to point out that the criticism 
came from a position of an „engineered ethics‟. However, in the same light, the moral 
dilemma of genetic engineering is not a dilemma we can remain ignorant about, since we 
must also accept that without it, those impoverished communities in drought-stricken areas, 
for example, would be completely helpless. This reveals the complexity of such an issue, and 
we do not have the luxury of objectivity to claim what is „ethical‟ and what is „unethical‟.  
Moreover, the complexity of moral dilemmas that espouse the difficulty of choosing equally 
valid but opposing norms and values demonstrate that the ethical issues that confront those 
working towards sustainable food systems cannot be addressed in isolation, but “pertain to 
the entire complex of agricultural practices and to the transition from production to 
sustainability” (Chrispeels & Mandoli, 2003:9). As a result, the approach to ethics in the food 
systems context cannot be a matter of “exclusive choices ... [from which] I must choose 
between two inadequate languages to express my indignation” (Norton, 1991:6), since 
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contexts change and values, and therefore, the reasons that satisfied an earlier moral choice 
may not apply. Instead of making claims of moral authority from positions of supposed 
ethical objectivity, there is a demand to, rather, deliberate on the moral dilemmas with which 
we are faced (Zimdahl, 2002). The richness of ethics is, after all, in our ethical questioning, 
not our answers. 
Nevertheless, the simplification of ethics in food systems continues, and its impact extends 
beyond those involved in food production. Typical of the „machine mind‟, is that the 
modernist market-orientated understanding of food systems is represented by an 
anthropocentric setting of consumers and producers, and so, moral considerations towards the 
ecological setting are disregarded. However, more interestingly, this thesis argues that this 
producer-consumer relationship is a linear and one-way relationship in character – typical of 
modernist thinking – and subsequently elucidates how consumers have also passively accept 
the ethical actions of those involved in the „production paradigm‟. This has resulted in an 
unreflective „consumer paradigm‟, which is characterised in the fast-food culture – “a cult of 
speed” (Cilliers, 2006:108). We have no idea where we get our food from, how it is made or 
what is in it – and we do not care, since we do not understand that to be part of our moral 
responsibility. However, this unreflective decision-making “makes us ill, divides us, and 
harms our planet” (Battersby & McLachlan, 2013:716). It is, therefore, notable how the food 
systems have had an effect on wider socioecological systems, as well as how the role that the 
„production paradigm‟ has played in our understanding that “the values needed to support a 
sustainability transition are not prevalent within contemporary society” (Henry, 2009:134). 
As such, this thesis further stresses how important it is to address how we understand ethics 
when we work towards sustainable food systems.  
It is necessary to rethink the moral certainty of the „production paradigm‟ that those involved 
in the food system have long held absolute, and acknowledge that an „engineered ethics‟ is 
insufficient in dealing with the difficult decisions we have to make in realising sustainable 
food systems. Of course, adopting a way of thinking that addresses ethical complexity will be 
significant learning process, but just like in the contexts of food systems, “ethics and social 
learning will be necessarily an important part of any decision-making process” (Blewitt, 
2008:43). Of course, responsibility cannot be shifted onto transcendental ethical standards, 
this expectation applies to every actor in the food system, since “failures of group decision-
making ... is of course related to the problem of failures of individual decision-making” 
(Diamond, 2005:420).  
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So, in order to understand ethics in sustainability transitions, especially in the food systems 
context, a thinking that embraces the ethical complexity of our moral dilemmas must be 
introduced. Such an understanding will no doubt be complex itself, but it is necessary to first 
lay appropriate foundations from which we can acknowledge the complex nature of our 
socioecological systems in changing contexts. Thereafter, we will be able to reflect on the 
demands of an appropriate understanding of moral responsibility in sustainability transitions.  
3.4: Chapter Summary 
This chapter has critiqued modern moral philosophy‟s inappropriate approach to the question 
of ethics. This has provided the necessary space from which a more appropriate way of 
thinking can be introduced that is more fitting in the context of sustainability transitions – 
from the lens of complexity and from which an apt and contextualised understanding of 
ethics can be provided.  
The first section presented the imagery that demonstrates this understanding of ethics‟ 
disregard for complexity, namely „manufacturing morality‟. Following this introduction, the 
next three sub-sections saw to unpack the fundamentals and implications of modernist ethics.  
Firstly, through the imagery of „an engineering ethics‟, the motivation and method of 
modernist ethics‟ approach to moral dilemmas was presented, which showed a continued 
ignorance towards complexity. Secondly, through the imagery of „an electioneering ethics‟, 
the investigation revealed how modernist ethics arrogantly confronted the contingency of 
difference in an ethical context and contrasting positions. Thirdly, through the imagery of „an 
evasion of ethics‟, this critique followed-up on the previous two sub-sections‟ allegations, by 
addressing the implications thereof, which focused on how modernist ethics corrupts the 
notion of moral responsibility.  
The last section of this chapter presented a contextual reflection on the modernist 
understanding of ethics with regard to food systems, and concentrated on how this 
understanding affects academic interest in realising sustainable food systems. 
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Part 2: The Mountain Mind and an Emerging Ethics  
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Chapter 4: The Mountain Mind – Imagining Complex Thinking 
4.1: Chapter Overview 
In short, this chapter presents the beginning of the philosophical exploration on how to think 
about ethics in sustainability transitions – from the perspective of complexity. To begin with, 
therefore, it is necessary to lay appropriate foundations of thought that will inform such an 
appreciation, through a conceptual analysis, from which a study of sustainability transitions 
can be appropriately positioned. After doing so, a suitably complex approach to the question 
of ethics can be introduced. 
The first section will present the imagery that represents a way of thinking that, in contrast to 
„thinking like a machine‟, attempts to account for complexity, namely „thinking like a 
mountain‟. From this introduction, the next three sub-sections will shed light on the 
principles of this complex way of thinking, and the implications thereof.  
Firstly, the revolutionary ontology and epistemology of complex thought is introduced, 
through the imagery of „a renaissance in reductionism and onwards‟. Secondly, through the 
imagery of „binding binaries and beyond‟, it is investigated how this way of thinking 
embraces and depends upon the contingency of difference and the views of others. Thirdly, 
through the imagery of „the mountain mind in modesty‟, this sub-section introduces the 
inherently ethical element of this paradigm, and therefore, complements the implications of 
the previous two sub-sections by commenting on the necessary attitude of modesty. 
The last section of this chapter provides a contextual reflection of this paradigm of thought 
with regard to food systems, and focuses on how this complex way of thinking will affect 
how academic inquiry can contribute to realising sustainable food systems. 
4.2: Thinking like a Mountain 
An appropriate paradigm of thought will have to address the complexity of our realities, 
which is “perhaps the most essential characteristic of our present society” (Heylighen et al., 
2007:117). Of course, the move to acknowledge the beautifully messy will “not lead us out of 
the woods, but it should enable a discussion that is more fruitful” (Cilliers, 2000b:8). So, 
instead of „thinking like a machine‟ – the strictly reductionist way of thinking about the world 
and how we relate to it – this study proposes that a more appropriate approach to 
sustainability transitions should rather be „thinking like a mountain‟. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
For centuries we have shied away from opening up to contingency, and refused to offer 
complexity any space in our investigations. In recent years this has changed, however, as 
academia is slowly learning the importance of acknowledging complexity and its significance 
(Audouin et al., 2012; Capra, 1996; Cilliers, 1998; Clayton & Radcliffe, 1996; Emmeche, 
2004; Harding, 2006; Hawken, 2007; Lyotard, 1984; Max-Neef, 2005; Morin, 1992; 
Nicolescu, 2002; Swilling and Annecke, 2012). Indeed, the recognition that living systems do 
not function under the same conditions as mechanistic systems led biologist Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy to note “that living systems, unlike their mechanical counterparts studied by 
Newtonian science, are intrinsically open” (as quoted in Heylighen et al., 2007:121). The 
implication of this revelation has meant that we seriously need to rethink the strictly 
reductionist ways in which think and reason about the world. The imagery of „thinking like a 
mountain‟ draws from the writings of Aldo Leopold (1991), who suggested that, in order to 
understand the complex nature of socioecological systems, one must adopt a similarly 
dynamic way of thinking that would complement the dynamic processes of such a 
socioecological system, like a mountain. Instead of short-term simplification, „thinking like a 
mountain‟ would emphasise a slow process of learning about the ever-emergent relationships 
that characterise a phenomenon in its context. Hattingh (1999:72) refers to this as thinking 
“in terms of ecological and geological time: the time it [takes] to evolve plants and animals 
and behaviour patterns appropriate to the conditions of the mountain slopes”. Although a 
„machine mind‟ paradigm might contest such a claim, it is necessary that “our relation with a 
complex world and a complex Nature, requires complex thought” (Max-Neef, 2005:14).  
However, whilst we may realise that we should be thinking more like a mountain than a 
machine, we must also realise that this will not gift us with complete understanding of the 
complexity of systems, because complexity is itself “incompressible” (Cilliers, 2004:22). 
After all, as Leopold (1991:137) has written, “only the mountain has lived long enough to 
listen objectively to the howl of the wolf”. Nevertheless, whilst we should refrain from 
reverting back to the one-dimensionality of strict reductionism, „thinking like a mountain‟ 
does not give up on the gift of reason. On the contrary, this study looks to introduce an 
argument that provides the necessary space for “an intelligent and sophisticated 
reductionism” (Clayton & Radcliffe, 1996:17). The paradox of „thinking like a mountain‟, 
therefore, is that it reveals the inescapable “need for reduction, while making the strategies 
for such reductionism transparent” (Audouin et al., 2013). This would, therefore, differ from 
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a reactionary anti-reductionist argument, and would embrace a kind of reflexive reductionism 
as is argued by Audouin et al. (2013).  
When we are „thinking like a mountain‟, we are acknowledging and embracing something 
that has long been excluded from our academic inquiries. As such, we are fundamentally 
challenging a number of deeply embedded assumptions we have about ourselves, and how we 
relate to a supposedly separated and simple world. This revolutionary shift in thinking that is 
introduced by an acknowledgement of complexity is, therefore, what Capra (1996:4) had in 
mind when he announced that “we are now at the beginning of such a fundamental change in 
worldview in science and society, a change of paradigms as radical as the Copernican 
revolution”.  
4.2.1: Towards a Renaissance in Reductionism and Onwards 
The openness of socioecological systems means that we are not just dealing with systems in 
general, but with complex systems. As such, if we are to say anything about the world and 
how we relate to it, we will have to adopt a soft and sensible form of reductionism that 
somehow respects the irreducibility of complexity and keeps it alive. The perspective of 
systems thinking still provides a possible way of thinking appropriately about complexity that 
does not kill it. However, this will mean moving beyond the „parts-whole‟ simplification. 
The importance of surpassing this „parts-whole‟ simplicity is evident when it is 
acknowledged that, in different contexts, „parts‟ are „wholes‟ and „wholes‟ are „parts‟. For 
example, if we want to know “with regard to Homo, which of the following is the system: the 
society, the species, or the individual?” (Morin, 1992:375), we are unable to keep one claim 
„truer‟ than the other. It is, therefore, wholly inadequate and quite crude to talk just about 
„parts‟ and „wholes‟, since there is so much more to the beautifully messy than just „things‟ – 
there are also „happenings‟. So, by exploring the importance and effects of context – an 
influence long-forgotten by the „machine mind‟ – our inquiries are able to shed light on these 
„happenings‟, or what Urry (2005:5) refers to as “system effects that are different from their 
parts”.  
When inquiries study and appreciate phenomena in their context, it is soon realised that it is 
not the „parts‟ or the „whole‟ that is of interest – or worth the worry – but rather how these 
„parts‟ and „wholes‟ interact and relate to each other. It is this different way of seeing and 
thinking about the world that “seems to explain the emergence of organisation in any domain 
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or context: physical, chemical, biological, psychological or social” (Heylighen et al., 
2007:126). Indeed, when we start to identify socioecological systems to be composed of more 
than just „bits‟ and „pieces‟, but of contextualised interactivity between the „bits‟ and 
„pieces‟, we begin to answer “a fundamental philosophical question ... [about the] apparent 
intelligence that we see around us” (Heylighen et al., 2007:126). Understanding the 
beautifully messy from the perspective of systems thinking, therefore, “means understanding 
relationships” (Capra, 1996:298). As such, this thesis argues that sustainability transitions can 
be understood to be about mending and sustaining the relationships between the complex 
social and ecological systems that are conducive to their interrelated vitality.  
However, and importantly, these are contextualised relationships. As such, it is always 
necessary to emphasise “the importance of contingent factors, of considering the specific 
conditions in a specific context at a specific time” (Cilliers, 2001:145). So, rather than 
reducing an isolated phenomenon to its componential „parts‟ or its totalising „whole‟, 
„thinking like a mountain‟, introduces a soft and sophisticated reductionism, which would 
entail seeking out “the relation of inseparability and of inter-retro-action between each 
phenomenon and its context and of every context with the planetary context” (Morin & Kern, 
1999:130). This means that academic inquiries must allow socioecological systems and their 
revitalising relationships to expose themselves in the research process. It is, after all, this 
openness to emergence that bears the fruitfulness of the „mountain mind‟. In this light, 
„thinking like a mountain‟ would necessarily acknowledge both “the downward direction of 
reduction or analysis, and the upward direction of holism or emergence, as equally important 
for understanding the true nature of the system” (Heylighen et al., 2007:122). The 
contextualised relationships are thus an emergent property of the dynamic processes of 
organisation actors, parts, wholes and events.  
Of course, „thinking like a mountain‟ is a still reductionism of complexity, but it is a „light‟ 
form of reductionism that works with complexity, not against it, and thus provides space for 
socioecological systems to express their dynamism – it lets the „happenings‟ happen. As 
such, whilst nothing absolute or complete can be said about complexity, this does allow us to 
say something about „general complexity‟ (Morin, 2007). It is no longer about mastering and 
controlling, but about monitoring and cooperating. Therefore, from the perspective of 
systems thinking, an understanding of complexity introduces an appreciation of the mystery 
of life as “a cluster of emergent qualities resulting from the process of interaction and 
organization between parts and the whole” (Morin, 1992:374). And so, in contrast to the 
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blurred lens of the „machine mind‟, which sees the beautifully messy as a separated space of 
lifeless objects, the „mountain mind sees a vibrant community of beautifully messy 
relationships – and we are part of that community!  
Indeed, it is this inclusionary perspective that “roots our own complex body more firmly in 
the natural world” (Emmeche, 2004:43). The inclusionary perspective, which is a result of 
thinking like a mountain, influences even how one sees something essential, such as self 
identity. In explaining how we understand ourselves in complex contexts, Cilliers (1998:116) 
references the work of Lyotard (1984), saying that “the self is understood in terms of a „fabric 
of relations‟, a node in a network”. Subsequently, one‟s own identity, as a scientist or as a 
politician, a consumer or a producer, a son or a daughters, is neither predetermined nor fixed, 
but “constituted in a complex network” (Woermann & Cilliers, 2012:416). In contrast to the 
„centred self‟, it is, therefore, important to emphasise the „complex self‟ as a participant 
contextualised in socioecological systems as well – decentralised, interconnected and 
interdependent, as opposed to centralised, separated and independent. And given the open 
nature of complex systems, a participatory and inclusionary approach to the world “is in fact 
the only available option” (Harding, 2006:33).  
Importantly, when it comes to studying sustainability transitions from a complexity 
perspective, as alluded to before, this reciprocal interdependence means that researchers share 
the same contexts of the systems they study, as “outputs of parts of the systems become 
inputs of others” (Lotrecchiano, 2010:39). We, therefore, have no scientific high-ground from 
which we can ascertain any knowledge that is free from the contingency of subjectivity. As 
such, when invested in the study of complex phenomena in complex contexts, we are 
inevitably dependent on reductionist interpretations and therefore, “cannot do other than 
model and exclude” (Woermann, 2013:47). This creates the boundaries with regard to the 
context of our knowledge, and the frame of boundaries in which we are able to reasonably 
discern the meaning of something. The consequence of this is that “uncertainty, 
indeterminacy, randomness, and contradictions appear not as residues to be eliminated by 
explanation, but as ineliminable ingredients of our perception” (Morin, 1992:381).  
This way of thinking about systems that moves beyond the classic „parts-whole‟ mentality 
“offers a way to gain an overview of complex systems” (Kagan, 2010:1096). As the changing 
contexts influence the relationships between and within the social and ecological systems, so 
too does this change an understanding of the beautifully messy. So, rather than feeding the 
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„machine mind‟ monster‟s desire to compartmentalise and control, this makes room for the 
„mountain mind‟ to approach the socioecological systems with awe and wonder.  
4.2.2: Towards Binding Binaries and Beyond 
Since the emphasis in the „mountain mind‟ is on respect and appreciation, this will mean that 
we will have to rethink how we approach that which has previously stood in the way of that 
desired control and objectivity we once emphasised – differences. Although there is an 
explicitly ethical element in this inclusive approach, this is not just sympathetic consideration 
for the contradictions and absurdities of the beautifully messy. To account for the 
subordinated „halves‟ of apparent non-existence, is part of the ongoing search to understand 
more richly how the interactions allow for complex systems to organise themselves.  
An appreciation of the complex organisation of systems will have to reimagine the dualistic 
separations invented by the „machine mind‟, not as simplified assimilated wholes, but as “a 
complement of two entities acknowledged as separate, different, independent, yet in 
relationships” (Warren, 1998:263). This approach is more engaging and welcoming than the 
conservative binary logic. Whilst the differences are still recognised, the „mountain mind‟ 
also recognises and respects their interdependency. They are co-identifying – they are co-
constituents. Cilliers (1998:138) comments on the importance of differences “as that which 
constitutes our humanity”. From this perspective, this thesis highlights how the different 
terms themselves are not as relevant as the relationship of difference between the terms.  
In contrast to the conservative binary logic of the „machine mind‟, this study will, therefore, 
propose that this understanding of identifying and embracing differences be referred to as a 
„liberal‟ binary logic. This can be related to the differential logic of Derrida (1978), who uses 
the term différance  to “signifying systems are constituted by a difference that both separates 
and joins” (Woermann, 2013:60). 
Of course, this will still represent a hierarchical relation, but the „mountain mind‟ entertains 
no stage of oppressive domination – the relation is more horizontal than vertical. Such an 
understanding of hierarchy, therefore, represents systemic interactions between two or more 
interpenetrating positions that “may be fairly limited or so extensive that it becomes difficult 
to typify the hierarchy accurately in terms of prime and subordinate parts” (Cilliers, 
2001:143-144). It is this appreciation of inseparability that allows academia to move beyond 
the dominant „either/or‟ divisions of modernist thinking. By appreciating that the seemingly 
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opposing terms are „joined at the hip‟, academic inquiries are now able to reveal how 
„thinking like a machine‟, itself, “undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical 
oppositions on which it relies” (Culler, 2008:86), and as such, gloriously uncover the 
inadequacy of the conservative binary logic. 
The demands of acknowledging complexity, and moreover, acknowledging complex systems, 
was never going to come from a paradigm of simplification – for very obvious reasons. These 
demands are further stressed, when it is understood that the complexity of socioecological 
systems are not made up of only two sides. It is part of a necessary reductionism to frame it 
so, in order to shed light on the „general‟ complexity. The result is that, rather than the 
universalising comfort of pseudo-order that was promised by the „machine mind‟, this would 
mean that the „mountain mind‟ would entail “uncertainties and antagonisms by bringing 
together terms that are mutually interconnected” (Morin, 1992:378). This is of 
epistemological significance, in that academia will have to integrate a creative way of 
thinking in our complex paradigm of thought, which supports “a dynamic feedback loop 
among [these] terms which are simultaneously complementary, competitive, and 
antagonistic” (Morin, 1992:383). Nevertheless, we will never be able to “conceive of our 
earthly identity and of anthropolitics without a thinking capable of relinking disjointed 
nations and compartmentalized areas of knowledge” (Morin & Kern, 1999:129). 
The importance of embracing this complex way of thinking about differences is unmistakable 
with regard to our academic inquiries. Since researchers are embedded in the context of their 
own studies, any position taken will always be differentiated from other ways of seeing and 
being, which limits the insight into anything complex. It is, therefore, reasonable that 
researchers open themselves up to working with other approaches, while maintaining their 
own academic identities, “not in order to see which one is best, but in order to help us to 
explore the advantages and limitations of all of them” (Cilliers, 2001:136-137). It is, 
however, not suggested that specialisations are discarded, but rather to reveal the idea that 
these specialisations will have more to offer when exposed to a wider context of cooperation. 
In this light, disciplinarity, interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity should complement each 
other, since such collaboration would generate “reciprocal enrichment that may facilitate the 
understanding of complexity” (Max-Neef, 2005:15). As such, academia should, therefore, not 
be understood as a linear and lonely road towards truth, but as „teamwork‟; “a process of 
working towards finding suitable strategies for dealing with complex phenomena” 
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(Woermann & Cilliers, 2012:406). This is complemented by the notion that science is, after 
all, “a tumultuous building site” (Morin 2007:21). 
Nevertheless, given that academia is mostly still stuck „thinking like a machine‟, it should 
explicitly focus on the notion of working towards working together. This is especially 
imperative in sustainability transitions, since much of our problems are as a result of our 
compartmentalised way of thinking. There is little debate, therefore, that in order to address 
our global polycrises, we are expected to make significant progressions in scientific 
understanding of the world. Encouragingly, however, is that such progress, be in the form of 
technologies or ideas, “is often made when attempts are made to bridge into the domain of 
other disciplines” (Clayton & Radcliffe, 1996:17). Therefore, to build a better socioecological 
relationship, the opportunities of offering contextualised “real-world solutions require 
dismantling some of the boundaries between disciplinary and programmatic fields” (Drimie 
& McLachlan, 2013:218). In other words, in remedying the relationships of academia, the 
approach of „thinking like a mountain‟ has the potential to also remedy our socioecological 
divisions.  
As such, it is proposed that academic inquiries into sustainability transitions can now 
approach the beautifully messy not with an „either/or‟ sight, but with „both/and‟ eyes. This 
openness to all areas of academia supports “capabilities for systems thinking, because it trains 
individuals and societies to think of themselves in relationship” (Kagan, 2010:1096). 
However, it should not be seen as a practice that leaves the organisational elements of science 
behind, since “searching for common structures across individual theories and local fields of 
knowledge is a truly legitimate aim of science” (Emmeche, 2004:24).  
4.2.3: Towards the Mountain Mind in Modesty 
In our acknowledgement of the complex nature of socioecological systems, there is still the 
insufficiency of any reductionist strategy, like „thinking like a mountain‟. However, it is not 
enough to wallow in this acknowledgement. Complexity thinking, therefore, requires a 
critical engagement “with the status and limits of our knowledge claims” (Woermann & 
Cilliers, 2012:404). Not only will this keep academia constantly reminded of these 
contingencies, but it will also keep it from slipping back into the arrogance of „thinking like a 
machine‟.  
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The paradigmatic shift in thinking that the lens of systems thinking has introduced is certainly 
“a different manner of seeing the world” (Max-Neef, 2005:15). However, it must be 
remembered that it is, of course, just one way of seeing the world – it is still just a lens of 
complexity. When this lens is introduced, therefore, it will never be able “to escape the 
moment of interpretation and decision” (Cilliers, 2000a:31) that emerges from all knowledge 
claims. This, in turn, offers us what Nicolescu has called „in vivo‟ knowledge; that which 
“corresponds between the external world of the object and internal world of the subject ... 
including a system of values” (Lotrecchiano, 2010:41). As such, the thesis emphasises that 
there is an inevitability of ethics in addressing complexity, since “our decisions always 
involve an element of choice that cannot be justified objectively, but are, in part, based on 
normative judgements” (Woermann & Cilliers, 2012:404). This uproots the foundations of 
„thinking like a machine‟ that have relied on a supposedly value-free prescription in its dream 
of order, and subsequently, revealing that our ontological and epistemological questions 
should be considered alongside our ethical questions.  
The pervasive presence of ethics in an interpretative interaction with the world “is an 
inevitable result of the inability of a theory of complexity to provide a complete description 
of all aspects of the system” (Cilliers, 2000a:30). For this reason, it must be stressed that 
acknowledging the ethical implications of our inquiries “is a structural element of complexity 
thinking” (Woermann & Cilliers, 2012:404). It will, therefore, be necessary to explicitly 
engage with this experience as part of academic rationality, as “we cannot properly 
understand the production of scientific knowledge without considering the role that 
normative theories play in our interpretation of real-world events” (Henry, 2009:136). 
However, this will only be elaborated on later in the study, and for now, this thesis will 
concentrate on the implications of our subjectivity and implicit normativity. In light of this, it 
is important that we highlight the need to counter the unintended consequences of these 
implicit normative impulses with the urgent introduction of a self-critical rationality to the 
„mountain mind‟.  
Scientific thinking should, therefore, be presently inclined to be just as sceptical about its 
own contingent subjectivity and shortcomings as it is about other things, like its past 
shortcomings. This would suggest that, more than just being self-reflective, an appropriate 
approach to complex systems would, in fact, have to be critically self-reflective. Indeed, such 
a way of thinking is “the outcome of acknowledging the irreducible nature of complexity” 
(Woermann & Cilliers, 2012:406). Of course, to be doubtful of our own reasoning may seem 
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paradoxical, but an honest appreciation of contextual complexity requires a thinking that “is 
open and enters into dialogue with a reality that resists it” (Morin & Kern, 1999:129). As 
such, it is sensible, not silly. Only by understanding and confronting scientific thinking‟s 
historical identity – our modernist deficit – can today and tomorrow‟s academic inquiries 
make “progress in ignorance” (Morin, 1992:378). Indeed, this may very well be supported by 
a liberal binary logic, in that this progress may emerge exponentially from this logic‟s 
openness and the constructive criticism from others that would follow, and vice-versa.  
By introducing a rationality of critical self-reflection (Preiser, Cilliers & Human, 2013), a 
space opens up that would acknowledge an inherent vulnerability to making uninformed 
decisions – or simply put, mistakes. The significance of critical self-reflection can, therefore, 
not be more stressed, especially given the pressures of possible socioecological collapse. 
After all, an understanding of complex systems teaches that, due to the non-linearity of their 
interactions, “small causes can have large effects” (Cilliers, 1999:123). And because of the 
phenomenon of feedback loops, these effects can sometimes multiply a problem, instead of 
solving it. What this means is that we are dealing not only with the limits of our knowledge 
claims, but also our limited knowledge about the impact of our knowledge claims. In the 
context of sustainability transitions, the argument for this epistemological jump is, therefore, 
a plea for caution in the midst of necessary action. As such, it is important that when 
engaging in academic inquiries, “we have a responsibility to make our research framing 
strategies explicit” (Audouin et al., 2013). 
This is, of course, not an argument to denounce our individual agency, since the value of our 
subjectivity is just as critical as our own criticism thereof. Indeed, given the nature of 
complex systems in which we exist, “you can only understand that of which you become a 
part” (Max-Neef, 2005:15). Therefore, similar to the technological understanding of the 
word, it is understood that placing too much emphasis on “the precautionary principle stifles 
innovation and runs contrary to the human desire to innovate so as to better our lot on Earth” 
(Chrispeels & Mandoli, 2003:8). It is, therefore, important that this self-critical rationality 
does not overwhelm research of sustainability transitions, to the extent that it stops us 
completely in our tracks. A deafening defeatist attitude has no place in confronting 
complexity. Therefore, in order to make the necessary progressions in science and culture, the 
modest approach to thinking about complexity must be coupled with bold and courageous 
action, by which research can necessarily  transgress its self-doubt, and thereby “violate 
accepted or imposed boundaries” (Woermann, 2013:76). Again, it is through harnessing a 
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liberal binary logic that it is understood that “modesty and transgressivity go hand-in-hand” 
(Woermann, 2013:77). 
Still, there will always be laggings and loose-ends in our knowledge claims, which can only 
further problematise our understanding of complex systems – this is the complexity of 
studying complexity. So, to remain aware of the inadequacy of our knowledge claims is also 
to remain humbly aware that this is a contingency that cannot be overcome.  As noted by 
Degenaar (1993:51), the revolutionary thinking that characterises the paradigm of complex 
thought must remain “conscious of the fact that the new dispensation can itself fall into 
absolutism ... [and so] eternal vigilance, continually holding off gods and tyrants, becomes 
part and parcel of this revolutionary attitude”. The emphasis of continuity satisfies both the 
honest impetus of this self-critical rationality, but also its logic, “which functions as a 
recursive modality” (Woermann, 2013:162). The „mountain mind‟, therefore, allows us to 
confront the „machine mind‟ and its dream of order, and thereby awaken the dormant owls of 
Minerva from a coma. In other words, an appropriate approach to complexity is not to 
overcome it, but to try and keep up with it.   
The burden of continuous modesty is arguably a deserved burden, given the state of 
socioecological systems and the anthropological role therein. However, paradoxically, it is 
also necessary to recognise that this burden is also a skill, since a thinking that is comfortable 
with the confusion of continuous self-criticism, will most certainly help us in understanding 
the character of sustainability transitions, which represents “apparently paradoxical 
reconciliations” (Kagan, 2010:1094). The insight received by a critical self-reflection has the 
potential, therefore, of providing academia with “important opportunities for fashioning ways 
of coping with future surprises and unknowable risks through intentionally building up 
resilience in socio-ecological systems” (Blewitt, 2008:43-44). This potential is further 
enriched when disciplines partner with other disciplines in critical dialogue. In this regard, 
thinking about sustainability transitions can only be satisfied by long-term thinking, as 
oppose to the short-sightedness of „thinking like a machine‟. It is, after all, “an unreflective 
fastness which returns you to the same place” (Cilliers, 2006:107). As such, whilst one must 
acknowledge the complexity of „thinking like a mountain‟, this thesis also emphasises the 
opportunity that this perspective offers in an understanding of socioecological contexts.  
In order to address the complex nature of our studies, we will have to acknowledge that, 
whilst we once reigned as „rightful‟ kings and queens of the world, the unearthing of our 
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subjectivity has revealed that we are just another species trying to survive a much larger 
story. Nevertheless, we are an exceptional species, and from the „mountain mind‟ paradigm, 
we can reason with these limits in mind. Since our approach to the beautifully messy would 
acknowledge the inherent complexity of this approach, we can be encouraged in 
acknowledging that „thinking like mountain‟ is itself beautifully messy. 
4.3: Thinking like a Mountain in the Context of Food Systems 
By acknowledging complexity, scientific thinking and academic inquiry positions itself more 
suitably to address the issues of sustainability transitions, and more importantly, 
appropriately approach the ethical complexity of these drastic times. However, it is necessary 
to reflect on the paradigmatic implications of „thinking like a mountain‟, so as to appreciate 
its revolutionary appeal. As such, the context of food systems has been provided as a space in 
which we can engage more critically with what it means to account for complexity.  
When we are „thinking like a mountain‟, it is acknowledged that the food system is an open 
and complex system. As such, the systemic nature of its sustainability issues would mean that 
they “cannot be understood in isolation ... [since] that they are interconnected, and 
interdependent” (Capra, 1996:3). An appropriate approach would, therefore, have to 
acknowledge that there are various contextually-defined components involved – some not 
even directly involved in the system – whose interactions with other components, and the 
system as a whole, are more important than the components themselves. Since it is this 
contextualised interactivity that constitutes the dynamic organisation of the system, 
sustaining the food system would, therefore, mean studying these interactions and sustaining 
those relationships that complement the vitality of the food system.  
Of course, to an extent, the insight of the „production paradigm‟ still has its place in a 
complex approach to understanding the food system. However, in studying the food system 
as a complex system, the openness thereof must be acknowledged, and similarly 
acknowledge that, amongst others, “the environmental system and the health/disease system 
are in dynamic interaction with the food system at various levels” (Drimie & McLachlan, 
2013:217). As such, any study that is aimed at researching what relationships maintain the 
integrity of the food system would have to include “the entire food value chain, from 
agricultural input markets, through food production, processing, distribution, retail, 
consumption and waste handling, as well as regulatory functions and support services” 
(Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:217). Scientists and researchers should now be able to embrace 
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the idea that the sustainability of the food system is about much more than production, but 
also, amongst others, about the “stewardship of the land, preservation of the resource base, 
the health of farm workers, the preservation of the small biota that are rich in biodiversity and 
are interspersed with fields, [and] the value of rural communities” (Chrispeels & Mandoli, 
2003:6).  
Nevertheless, given that the complexity of the food system is irreducible, we must remember 
that we will never be able to account for the full systemic nature thereof. For example, the 
„production paradigm‟ offers some relevant knowledge to our academic inquiry of the food 
system, but its understanding thereof is, of course, limited by its own disciplinary context. It 
is, therefore, suggested that the necessary strategies of reductionism in our own academic 
inquiries are countered with a modest openness towards other disciplines, thereby “actively 
embracing plural, participatory, and interrelated strategies for sustainability” (Audouin et al., 
2013). This would support the notion that, in light of the failings of the „production 
paradigm‟, “new collaborative relationships and networks are needed to move the food 
security agenda forward” (McLachlan & Hamann, 2011:429).  
Indeed, even the controversial players of genetic engineering – like that of Monsanto – will 
have a role in addressing food security. Given that the academic playing fields are levelled, 
the influence of such corporations cannot be denied, since “science and technology will have 
an increasingly important role to play in mitigating the negative effects of the forces of 
change on the world food system and their impacts on the poorest and hungry people” (von 
Braun, 2009:13). When entering an academic dialogue, academic inquiries should, therefore, 
begin by being explicit about the framing strategies of its research, as well as openly 
identifying the scientific context from which it approaches a food system issue like food 
security. As such, other disciplines, which are also expected to adopt this approach of 
openness and modesty, will be able to shed a different light on this respective issue, and as a 
result, a deeper understanding of the food system context is revealed. This will result in the 
fruitful potentiality of “in-depth disciplinary research on defined issues with integrated 
research programmes that span disciplines and sectors, [and] engage stakeholders” (Drimie & 
McLachlan, 2013:217) 
However, in acknowledging the complexity of the food system and the limited access to 
knowledge thereof, academia will also have to acknowledge that this context is in permanent 
flux, which risks this contextually-defined knowledge being rendered obsolete. As such, 
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„thinking like a mountain‟ demands academic discourse to continue with every change of the 
food system context – we need a “permanent potentiality for the evolution of knowledge” 
(Max-Neef, 2005:13). Indeed, an appreciation of complexity tells us that “both systems and 
systems thinking continually evolve” (Blewitt, 2008:43). So, as well as emphasising the value 
that a multidisciplinary approach or an interdisciplinary approach can offer, a dedicated effort 
to realising sustainable food systems must go a step further. Therefore, when we are „thinking 
like a mountain‟, we need to acknowledge the ongoing commitment to academic discourse 
that is inherent in the approach of transdisciplinarity, which defines itself as “both a tool and 
a project” (Max-Neef, 2005:15). As such, this thesis argues that this academic approach to 
food system challenges can be regarded as a virtuous circle, since “a knowledge feedback 
loop is critical to the sustainability of complex adaptive systems” (Lotrecchiano, 2010:59). 
This has led Drimie and McLachlan (2013:219) to explicitly pronounce that “food security is 
a transdisciplinary challenge and requires transdisciplinary responses”.  
It is fitting that, in order to address the challenges of a complex system like the food system, 
we match it with the complexity of the transdisciplinary approach. However, this is no small 
task. Indeed, the transdisciplinary approach pays “particular attention to joint learning” 
(Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:217). After all, one of the most fundamental messages about 
sustainability transitions is that, in the Marxist spirit, “if you want to change the world in a 
constructive direction, you better try to understand it first ... [which] means learning” 
(Chomsky, 2012:44). There have been mistakes made due to „thinking like a machine‟, but 
now academia must learn from those mistakes. Indeed, progress comes from reworking 
earlier errors. In a community where “information and ideas flow freely through the entire 
network ... [then] the diversity of interpretations and learning styles – even the diversity of 
mistakes – will enrich the community” (Capra, 1996:303-304). However, to commit to this 
learning process is also not simple, since “assuming that high levels of interaction between 
stakeholders in any given situation will lead to social learning is simplistic, and a deeper 
understanding of the context, power dynamics, and values that influence the ability of people 
and organizations ... is necessary” (Reed et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, as an alternative approach to sustainability transitions, „thinking like a 
mountain‟ presents a more appropriate way of scientific thinking about food systems issues, 
and thus offers a suitable position from which academic inquiry can address these complex 
issues. It challenges scientists and researchers to think critically about certain concepts in a 
new manner, like what it means to have knowledge about the food systems context, or how 
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„food‟ is understood in different contexts, and the interconnected relationship of production 
and consumption, which would, for example, encourage a learning process of appropriately 
balancing localised farming practices with large-scale industrialised agriculture. 
Whilst the „mountain mind‟ is aware of its normativity, and as such, ethical in its openness 
and critical self-reflection, it is still necessary to ask how this paradigm of thought would 
address an explicitly ethical experience. Such a continued critical reflection would provide a 
deeper understanding of what it means to account for complexity, since we cannot discuss 
philosophy without discussing ethics. However, it is also clearly imperative to address this in 
the context of sustainability transitions, especially given the ethical complexity of a complex 
food system, in which difficult moral choices will have to be made.  
4.4: Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the beginning of the philosophical exploration on how to think about 
ethics in sustainability transitions – from the perspective of complexity. By doing so, 
academia‟s approach to ethics in the context of sustainability transitions can now be 
appropriately positioned.  
The first section introduced the imagery that demonstrates a way of thinking that, in contrast 
to „thinking like a machine‟, attempts to account for complexity, namely „thinking like a 
mountain‟. From this introduction, the next three sub-sections presented the principles of this 
complex way of thinking, and the implications thereof.  
Firstly, the revolutionary ontology and epistemology of complex thought was introduced, 
through the imagery of „a renaissance in reductionism and onwards‟. Secondly, through the 
imagery of „binding binaries and beyond‟, it was investigated how this way of thinking 
embraces and depends upon the contingency of difference and the views of others. Thirdly, 
through the imagery of „the mountain mind in modesty‟, this sub-section introduced the 
inherently ethical element of this paradigm, and therefore, complemented the implications of 
the previous two sub-sections by commenting on the necessary attitude of modesty. 
The last section of this chapter provided a contextual reflection of this paradigm of thought 
with regard to food systems, and focused on how this complex way of thinking will affect 
academia‟s approach and interest in realising sustainable food systems. 
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Chapter Five: An Emerging Ethics – Imagining Complex Ethics 
5.1: Chapter Overview 
In short, this chapter will follow on from the insight provided by the previous chapter, so as 
to offer an appropriate way of thinking about ethics in sustainability transitions – one which 
accounts for complexity. As a critical philosophical exploration, this chapter will demonstrate 
how the very way of thinking from a complexity perspective is inseparable from its 
understanding of ethics, and as such, will be suitably positioned to address the ethical 
complexity of the ever-contingent realities of socioecological interactions. 
The first section will introduce the imagery that demonstrates how this demanding 
understanding of ethics addresses complexity, namely „practising provisionality‟. Following 
this introduction, the next three sub-sections unpack the fundamentals of a complex approach 
to ethics, and the implications thereof.  
Firstly, through the imagery of „a renaissance in responsibility‟, the pressure and importance 
of addressing ethical complexity is presented, as well as the demanding strategy to do so. 
Secondly, through the imagery of „collaborative conversations and to be continued‟, is the 
exploration of how a complex understanding of ethics relishes and revels in the contingency 
of difference and contrasting positions in an ethical context. Thirdly, through the imagery of 
„an emerging ethics in earnest‟, this sub-section highlights the continuous commitment that is 
needed in „practising provisionality‟, and therefore, complements the implications of the 
previous two sub-sections by commenting on how a complex ethics must be regarded as a 
process of social learning.  
The last section of this chapter provides a contextual reflection on a complex approach to 
understanding ethics with regard to food systems, and concentrates on how this will affect 
academic interest in realising sustainable food systems. 
5.2: Practising Provisionality 
The extent of revolutionary thinking that the „mountain mind‟ paradigm has introduced is 
most notable in our conceptualisation of ethics. From the perspective of complexity, we can 
no longer be content with the processed and packaged product of „manufacturing morality‟, 
“since complexity implies a serious engagement with contingency” (Woermann, 2013:vii). 
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As such, we will have to dedicate „how we ought to live‟ in a way that will satisfy a constant 
and critical engagement with this contingency; by „practising provisionality‟. 
The sensitivity of complex interactions, across social and ecological systems, has meant that 
ethical actions can have consequences that fall outside of an ethical context, and similarly, 
that actions that are not considered to be part of an ethical context can have ethical 
consequences. The implication of this, as emphasised in this thesis, is that the question of 
what it is to be ethical can no longer equate to a simple calculation, and as such, our 
understanding of what it is to be ethical becomes exponentially complex. So, as the tight grip 
that the „machine mind‟ has held on moral philosophy slowly loosens, “the simplistic idea of 
a just society, founded on a scientific ideology and the creation of the new man, is 
unravelling under the pull of a multidimensional complexity” (Nicolescu, 2002:37).  
However, whilst this unravelling has shed some light onto an extending ethical context, the 
paradox is that we will never be able to consider the „true‟ extent of this context, and as a 
result, we will never know the „true‟ meaning of what it is to be ethical. As said earlier in this 
thesis, an appreciation of complexity reveals to us that there is an inherently normative 
element in our slow and soft reductionism of complexity, but ironically, however, is that this 
also applies to the study of ethics. As such, “the logic which informs the ethics of complexity 
commits us to accepting the complexity of ethics” (Woermann & Cilliers, 2012:404). This 
thesis, therefore, emphasises that the moral dilemma is something that emerges at each 
complex interaction. In other words, every experience of complexity is an „ethical experience 
of complexity‟. This means that we will have to reconceptualise our understanding of this 
„emerging ethics‟ “as something that constitutes both our knowledge and us, rather than as a 
normative system that dictates right action” (Woermann & Cilliers, 2012:404).  
Of course, this revelation reveals “the fundamental problem of complexity which is 
epistemological, cognitive, paradigmatic” (Morin, 2007:10). However, if academia dedicates 
itself to honestly reflect on this realisation – by participating in the complex system of ethics 
– then our inquiries will not only be in the position to appropriately understand the 
complexity of our studies, but also to address ethics more appropriately. It is, therefore, in 
addressing the drama and possibilities of the „ethical experience of complexity‟ – by 
„practising provisionality‟ – that we are able to not only readjust our moral compass, but to 
also change the way we navigate. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
59 
 
5.2.1: Towards a Renaissance in Responsibility and Onwards 
When the seriousness of acknowledging our „ethical experience of complexity‟ is understood, 
we become aware of the extent to which all previous moral expectations are exceeded. The 
magnitude of reflection and courage of decision-making that is demonstrated in complex 
ethical reasoning is not just expressive of an extended moral consideration, but also an 
exceptionally demanding moral responsibility. The gravity of addressing our ethical 
understanding of complexity is, therefore, met with the heaviness of „practising 
provisionality‟. 
We are reminded that our position in a complex system is only validated by our relation to 
the system. In ethics, therefore, our effective relationship is determined by the choices we 
make. As such, the values that we decide upon can be understood as “emergent properties of 
the social system” (Cilliers, 1998:111). So, if we are serious about engaging ethically in the 
world, this will mean that we will have to engage with a system of ethics – we must make 
choices – otherwise “without the energy provided by engaging with the system, it would 
probably wither away” (Cilliers, 2000a:28). However, the complexity of ethics reveals to us 
that there is no way to judge whether the decisions we make are „right‟ or „wrong‟, since 
there is no a priori grounds on which to base our moral choices. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that we cannot say anything about our moral responsibility. Quite the opposite, in fact, 
since an acknowledgment of complexity “sets us free, not to do as we like, but to behave 
ethically” (Cilliers, 1998:138).  
Whilst these decisions may be made “in the dark” (Cilliers, 2000a:29), we are not blind. 
Morality is, “at the very least, the effort to guide one‟s conduct by reason – that is, to do what 
there are the best reasons for doing” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:14). The impetus of ethics is, 
after all, to address how we think we ought to live. Yet, what we think is „best‟ is, of course, 
always framed by our subjective surroundings, and therefore, a reduction of the ethical 
complexity with which we are faced. We will never be able to account for all the facts and 
figures, contextual factors and feelings, and as such, we will always fail in our “attempt to do 
homage to non-existence” (Woermann & Cilliers, 2012:410). This brings us back to the 
complexity of ethics, and there is no escaping this. However, rather than giving up, we are 
asked to give more, since our responsibility is not just to the decision, but to “the 
consequences of the judgement – which are never fully predictable” (Cilliers, 2004:24). 
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In this light, Cilliers (2004:24) invites us to “do the best we can each time we have to make 
an ethical choice”, since the question of „how we ought to live‟ is a question that we have to 
ask at every „ethical experience of complexity‟. This introduces a strategy to guide our 
morality called „the provisional imperative‟ (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010), which necessitates 
explicit and vigorous moral reasoning at every „ethical experience of complexity‟, along with 
the understanding that each decision is subject to revision. Every moment is a moment that 
urges us to question the appropriateness of the values that we apply to a context. As such, this 
strategy is able to somewhat satisfy the ongoing demands of an „emerging ethics‟, which 
allows us as morally engaged citizens to remain open to the complexity of ethics, whilst at 
the same time, acknowledging the necessity of reducing that complexity through our ethical 
decision-making (Woermann, 2013). Like a self-critical reflection, it requires a constant and 
recursive rationality – it is a practice, and so, it must be “perceived as a process” (Cilliers, 
2004:19). So, whilst justice will not come as a consequence of our ethical decisions, we will 
have to accept that it too comes as an emergent property only in “the moment of the decision” 
(Woermann, 2013:115). Nevertheless, once the decision is made, justice will have, of course, 
been thwarted, and it is expected that the process of „practising provisionality‟ begins again.  
The commitment required to „practising provisionality‟ is dreadfully demanding, and the 
pressure of always and necessarily engaging with our „ethical experience of complexity‟ is 
like no other expectation of moral responsibility. Of course, we will never be able to account 
for the entire collection of our normativity, and at this point, we should be “sensitive to the 
facts about human nature” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:192). However, the system of ethics is a 
system with a history, so it would be unreasonable and irresponsible to go about „practising 
provisionality‟ without considering “our moral tradition” (Woermann, 2013:120). We can, as 
a result, be mildly comforted by the assurance that, whilst moral facts cheat the game of 
ethical strategising, we can play around with moral rules. The complexity of ethics is, after 
all, “the outcome of freedom and structure” (Woermann, 2013:112). We must remember that 
the earlier critique of modernist ethics was not directed at moral rules, but rather directed at 
our strict adherence to their existence. So, we must acknowledge that this position gives us 
the right to accept the formalisation of ethical action, but at the same time, the responsibility 
of „practising provisionality‟ requires us “to remotivate the legitimacy of the rule each time 
we use it” (Cilliers, 1998:139-140). Of course, it is not the purpose of this paper to provide 
these principles – this would require contextual reasoning – rather, the purpose is just to 
emphasise how we should go about practising such principles; provisionally. 
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In the context of sustainability transitions, our understanding of this complex ethical 
reasoning is immeasurably important, since “a crux of success of failure as a society is to 
know which core values to hold on to, and which to discard and replace with new values” 
(Diamond, 2005:433). These decisions, however, will have already been informed by a 
history of smaller and implicit choices. These „big‟ decisions must, therefore, be 
acknowledged to be part of a process that has already begun – we are always making „big‟ 
decisions. So, it is imperative that to understand sustainability transitions as not just having 
an ethical element, but as something identifiably ethical, and therefore, that we encourage an 
entire culture of „practising provisionality‟. As such, the decision-making process, at all 
levels and in all spheres, must remain explicit and transparent, so as to keep our commitment 
to „practising provisionality‟ from straying out-of-practice. Indeed, as stated by Max-Neef 
(2005:9), “if ethical principles and values that should conform a society orientated towards 
the common good, are not made explicit, no policies coherent with the challenge can be 
successfully designed”.  
We must accept that the luxury of our critical position has been balanced out by “the 
loneliness of moral choice” (Bauman, 1992:xxii). In this regard, the unending responsibility 
of „practising provisionality‟ is not easy, and indeed, overwhelming. Nevertheless, this is the 
nature of ethics and what keeps it relevant – the dilemma of ethics is ethics itself! In Rodin‟s 
The Thinker, this tension is timelessly portrayed, representing the eternal strife and struggle 
to understand our dilemmas, as both contexts and our knowledge of contexts change. We 
must, therefore, accept and embrace our engagement with ethical complexity.  
5.2.2: Towards Collaborative Conversations and to be Continued 
The demands and pressure that we face in „practising provisionality‟ may be cripplingly 
consuming, especially for those of who have remained passive. However, we must realise 
that this is a sensation that we all share, since we are all faced with the same expectations of 
moral reasoning. Even though our choices are individual, ethics is, after all, a social activity. 
It makes sense, therefore, that we should nurture our understanding thereof through “trusting 
relations and through an active recognition of, and engagement with, difference” (Woermann 
& Cilliers, 2012:404-405). So, in our engagements with moral dilemmas, we must celebrate 
the opportunity to participate in this complex system. 
Although ethics will never be easy, we should welcome any offer that makes its difficulty 
more tolerable. Indeed, when we acknowledge that we are not completely alone on our 
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ethical journeys, we are reminded of why we engage with the questions of „how we ought to 
live‟. Human beings are social creatures, and we delight in company. Indeed, when we are 
faced with making difficult decisions in our appeal to „do justice‟ and to „do good‟, “we find 
ourselves impelled to act in certain ways as a result of deliberation, as a result of thinking 
about our behaviour and its consequences” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:193). However, more 
than a convenience, this is actually a rational strategy of ethical reasoning – as long as we 
remain in collaborative conversations, not conflicting cut-offs. After all, if we want our 
culture to be an ethical culture, “we need a revolution of human relationships” (Krznaric, 
2008:18). So, we are asked to commit to discourse and dialogue as “central to guiding our 
way and to defining the most ethical path possible” (Chrispeels & Mandoli, 2003:8).  
Therefore, rather than seeing the diverse ethical theories that have emerged throughout the 
history of rationality as a useless space of wasted energy, we should make the most of the 
fantastic opportunity to be relieved of the weight of moral choice, and revel in all that is 
offered. Indeed, if we believe that a system of ethics is something worth attending to, 
“resilience necessitates the preservation of diversity” (Kagan, 2010:1095) – the variety within 
the system will ensure a rich flow of information and energy, which will keep it robust and 
relevant. After all, amongst all the narrow-mindedness, the history of modernist ethical 
theories is, of course, filled with interesting and respectable insights into „how we ought to 
live‟. Arguably, if we were left without these theories and critiques, there would be no 
present of future case for ethical action – the incentive for this study‟s argument would have 
not existed, let alone the argument itself. As with the foundation of established principles and 
positions, the richness of ethical interpretations provides us with a somewhat pro-active 
approach to complex ethical reasoning. From this perspective, we can understand how 
„practising provisionality‟ is both a self-directed strategy, and a socially-engaging strategy.  
What this means is that we should open up to those ethical position and values from which 
we have been distanced when „thinking like a machine‟. This would entail welcoming back 
the subordinated theories of care and compassion from feminist literature, as well as 
accepting the insights of indigenous and localised understandings of „what is right and what 
is wrong‟. However, this openness also means that we cannot now turn our backs on the 
dominant masculine theories of duty. Indeed, part of our moral responsibility can be 
understood, to an extent, as the duty to care. As feminist-ethicist Baier (1994:4) has said in 
light of this understanding, “women theorists will need to connect their ethics of love with 
what has been the men theorists‟ pre-occupation, namely, obligation”. We are, therefore, 
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encouraged to “make room for myth, feeling, love, and regret, and consider them rationally” 
(Morin & Kern, 1999:129). Yet, in the expectation of openness, „practising provisionality‟ 
still expects that we make choices and draw the contextual line – it still “has to inspire moral 
action of some form” (Krznaric, 2008:11). In other words, we must keep our blinds up, but 
not keep our windows wide open. Given this acceptance, we can appreciate the practice of 
provisionality to also be understood as a commitment to act on informed empathy. 
It is, nevertheless, this openness to otherness that will be critically influential in guiding 
socioecological systems along our sustainability transitions. After all, with regard to 
embracing the values of care and compassion, it is quite evident that the atrocities that we 
have inflicted on others, on the Earth, and on ourselves require “a response from the heart” 
(Hawken, 2007:188). Harvard biologist Gould (1993:40), who has clearly stepped outside his 
discipline‟s boundaries, says that “we cannot win this battle to save species and environments 
without forging an emotional bond between ourselves and nature as well – for we will not 
fight to save what we do not love”. In this light, Kagan (2010:1098) offers the notion of an 
„open ethics‟ as a framework for allowing such an appropriate ethical culture to grow, which 
would “require that the individual human being be always reflexive about his or her own 
perspectives on reality and about the contingencies in which he or she is embedded”. 
Therefore, in understanding the ethical complexity of sustainability transitions, the “freedom 
to appeal to a variety of value systems may ultimately prove the greatest strength of the 
movement” (Norton, 1991:12).  
Yet, we must again remember that with the liberty of ethical reflection also comes the 
necessity of ethical decision-making, albeit provisional. The balancing act of openness and 
assertiveness will remain a massive obstacle, given the sensitivity of sustainability issues. 
This will, of course, be expected, especially when there are a multitude of stakeholders that 
are directly involved – for example, between localised value systems and institutional value 
systems. In such cases, the openness of ethical debate may be a hindrance. However, any 
inflexibility towards ethical dialogue must be acknowledged as a side-effect of the „machine 
mind‟ sickness – it might not be something we can cure, but it is something that we can 
remedy. It is, in anyway, our moral responsibility to engage in these discussions, because, as 
Morin has said, “the knowledge of complexity demands a politics of civilization” (Nicolescu, 
2002:37). 
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Of course, the enlarging of our moral consideration, not only with regard to socioecological 
systems, but also with regard to how we allow our ethical reasoning to be guided by the 
variety of values, does not provide us with an escape route to the difficulty of moral choice. 
We are still left with the demands and pressures of our moral responsibility. However, our 
collective participation in the complex system of ethics does make the personal journey of 
„how we ought to live‟ more tolerable. This is important encouragement when „practising 
provisionality‟, and may bring back a sense of structure to our societal behaviour.  
5.2.3: Towards an Emerging Ethics in Earnest 
As we navigate our way through sustainability transitions, we will have to commit to the 
difficult demands and ever-present pressures of addressing an „emerging ethics‟. It is our 
moral responsibility, but we must also appreciate that it is also an opportunity to approach our 
complex issues more appropriately. So, whilst we might be fooled into thinking that 
„practising provisionality‟ will numb our creativity in approaching the beautifully messy, we 
need to reflect on the extent to which „practising provisionality‟ is able to add advantage to 
our efforts of addressing complexity. 
A complex ethics makes a seemingly impossible request. It may seem that we are destined to 
fail, since “it is only to be expected that sometimes we try to avoid listening to its demands” 
(Rachels & Rachels, 2007:47) – only to be inclined to start again. As such, the practice of 
provisionality and its recursive rationality can naively be interpreted as a recurring dream of 
order – a dead-end job. Indeed, it is our own choice to adopt this perspective or not, but it 
risks us giving up on reason and giving in to the impulsiveness of pure pragmatism, which is 
an inappropriate approach to „how we ought to live‟, especially in sustainability transitions. 
Addressing complexity was never going to be easy, so we must always be aware of whether 
we ignorantly choose the easy way out over our moral responsibility. In response to this, 
Degenaar (1993:56) says that “only hope as a creative expectation will suffice”. Zinn 
(2002:208) supports this message, reminding us that “to be hopeful in bad times is not just 
foolishly romantic ... [but] based on the fact that human history is a history not only of 
cruelty, but also of compassion, sacrifice, courage, kindness”. 
In addressing complexity, “the importance of context and history means that there is no 
substitute for experience” (Cilliers, 2000b:12). The reason for hope is, therefore, that 
„practising provisionality‟ not only underlines that our ethical decisions are provisional and 
require constant revision, but also that it is a practice; and like when we practice manners, we 
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rely on experience. In light of this, „practising provisionality‟ is a virtuous cycle, rather than a 
vicious cycle. It is both a necessary process of ethical decision-making, as well as an 
opportunity to exercise our ethical reasoning that informs that process. Of course, the ethical 
complexity of everything will not mean that practice makes perfect, but philosophy is “the art 
of reflection” (Cilliers, 2006:111), and as any artist will tell us, practice makes progress. So, 
whilst we must appreciate that “in reasoning about what to do, we can be consistent or 
inconsistent” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:193), we should also be reassured that we have the 
potential to improve upon that consistency. Life is one long „learning curve of complexity‟, 
and since we are curious and ambitious creatures, we are on a continuous quest to understand 
the world and how we relate to it. As such, our history of participation with the complex 
system of ethics, and our “artful practice of life” (Kagan, 2010:1100), will inform our 
understanding of ethics, and therefore, our practice of provisionality. 
Indeed an „open ethics‟ is both an “ethics of diversity stewardship and [an] ethics of learning 
capabilities” (Kagan, 2010:1098). So, if we are open to the possibility of potential – that we 
could always reason through our moral dilemmas more appropriately – then it motivates us 
that we should always look to engage in an „emerging ethics‟ more appropriately. 
Interestingly, this also applies for the skill of critical self-reflection, since both this skill “and 
the provisional imperative place us under a moral obligation to stay open to the future and to 
the to-come, whilst simultaneously compelling us to respond to the urgency of the situation 
by taking in a position and assuming action” (Woermann, 2013:77). In fact, we are able to go 
so far as to say that, by „practising provisionality‟, it is not only our complex ethical 
reasoning that we are working on, but also this skill of our modest rationality. As such, in our 
appreciation that ethics and our other ontological and epistemological questions are 
inextricably linked, the practice of provisionality allows us to reconnect these modernist 
separations, and reunite the family of philosophy. The hope that is inherent in the practice of 
provisionality, therefore, creates “a moral space in which the notion of a sustainable future 
may be articulated in a manner that may help to transform present society, its structures and 
processes” (Hattingh, 2012:18).  
Again, we must once again be reminded that we are not alone in our learning curve of 
complexity. Neither we nor our knowledge can be excluded from our socioecological 
contexts, and so, our understanding of the world progresses as “a cerebral translation starting 
from data of the external world and a mental reconstruction, starting from certain organizing 
potentialities of the spirit” (Morin, 2007:21). In this sense, we need not draw divisions 
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between individual and social learning, since this “ignores the important insight that human 
behaviour is both individually determined and socially embedded” (Henry, 2009:135). So, 
with ethics being a social activity that is energised by individual actions, we can understand 
the process of „practising provisionality‟ to not just be an individual learning process, but also 
a social learning process. Indeed, whilst the concept of social learning is not uncommon, it 
has recently seen a surge in its use “to teach citizenship” (Reed et al., 2010). As such, it is not 
only our own ethical strategising that we are working on, but by having a kind of creative 
feedback loop, the process of „practising provisionality‟ also allows people to “learn from 
each other in ways that can benefit wider social-ecological systems” (Reed et al., 2010). So, 
as with the values we choose, both this process of social learning and the benefits thereof can 
be understood as emergent properties of a complex system of ethics.  
From this perspective, it is argued that, at every „ethical experience of complexity‟, the 
reciprocal learning process of „practising provisionality‟ can inform “some combination of 
virtues, motives, and methods of decision making that is best for me, given my 
circumstances, personality, and talents” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:199). However, as with 
any art, this is talent that we need to hone. Wisdom takes time. Yet, we need look no further 
than Nature for inspiration. Or as Hawken (2007:189) puts it, “all people and institutions, 
including commerce, governments, schools, churches, and cities, need to learn from life”. 
After all, it has been here for a few billion years. Indeed, this is what Leopold (1991) had in 
mind, when he first suggested we be „thinking like a mountain'. He saw “the mountain 
„thought‟ in terms of ecological and geological time: the time it took to evolve plants and 
animals and behaviour patterns appropriate to the conditions of the mountain slopes” 
(Hattingh, 1999:72). Therefore, as much as we need to be „thinking like a mountain', we also 
need to be „thinking like a student‟ – we need to be „learning like a mountain‟. 
This may be reminiscent of virtue ethics. There is, of course, priceless value in the teachings 
of Plato, Socrates, Aristotle and other thinkers, both ancient and contemporary, who argue for 
virtue ethics. Virtue ethics argue for a collection of character traits that would be “manifested 
in habitual action” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:175), in order to make you a good person. 
Whilst this may represent something similar to „practising provisionality‟, this thesis is not 
prepared to label a „correct‟ method and set ethical theories, and is open to any evolution of 
experimentation that is practised by this way of thinking – be it based on virtues or not. The 
purpose of this is to address what it means to engage in a complex system of ethics. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
When we understand ethics as a complex system, we play an „infinite game‟, in which “the 
object of the game is to keep playing” (Hawken, 2007:187). However, we are not hitting 
tennis balls against a wall by ourselves, but playing with a partner, knocking the balls back 
and forth over the net. So, more than just playing for the sake of playing, our continual and 
collective participation in this „infinite game‟ will mean that we will learn more about the 
game, the context of the game, how to appropriately play the game, and as such, more about 
ourselves. For that reason, an honest approach to an „emerging ethics‟ will provide us with 
the ongoing experience to appropriately play the other complex games of life.  
5.3: Practising Provisionality in the Context of Food Systems 
Our acknowledgment of ethical complexity places a massive amount of expectation on us as 
individuals. However, it is in assuming this moral responsibility that we are in an appropriate 
position to address the ethical issues and moral dilemmas that we will encounter in 
sustainability transitions. Nevertheless, the intricate orientation of the „mountain mind‟ is 
something that deserves further elaboration. As such, by contextualising this understanding of 
ethics in food systems, we are offered the necessary space from which we can critically 
reflect on these expectations, and the extent of our moral responsibility.  
When we are „practising provisionality‟ in food systems, we acknowledge the ethical 
complexity of working towards providing food security. Our moral choices will be 
characterised by choosing one value over another, with no a priori substantiation, and with 
unpredictable consequences, especially in this context, since “social action and ecological 
effects are tightly linked” (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:219). As such, the moral dilemmas 
contextualised by the food system require a continuous ethical reasoning, known as the 
„provisional imperative‟ (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010). This is something to be welcomed, as “it 
makes sense to complement a renewed commitment to the scientific and technical dilemmas 
of food security with a commitment to creating spaces for dialogue and action on food and its 
role in our national, professional and personal lives” (McLachlan & Hamann, 2011:430). 
Of course, the simplified utilitarian doctrine of the „production paradigm‟ does not account 
for socioecological complexity, but we must not be so quick to write-off its arguments. 
Indeed, it is not that its values are „wrong‟, but rather that „practising provisionality‟ 
emphasises the complexity of assuming any value. Whether we choose to follow the morality 
of the „production paradigm‟ is our individual choice, but it is a choice we have to make at 
every „ethical experience of complexity‟ – we cannot rely on any „moral high-ground‟ when 
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we engage in responsible ethical decision-making. From the perspective of an „emerging 
ethics‟, the contingency of our ethical context means that “each situation calls for fresh 
judgement” (Woermann, 2013:161). The food system is an ever-changing context with many 
role-players and many interactions with other systems – our ethical context extend throughout 
socioecological systems. So, we must appreciate that the values we hold dear might not apply 
at certain times. This is especially relevant when we consider the uncertainty that typifies 
sustainability transitions.  
Indeed, in understanding the complexity of ethics, we highlight “the important role that 
context and contingency play in shaping and informing our ethical sensibilities” (Woermann, 
2013:160-161). As such, whether we are a producer or a consumer, a politician or a fruit-
picker, our socioecological interactions with the food system all need to go through a 
necessary process of ethical reasoning, although this will still represent a necessary exclusive 
moral consideration. As such, this ethical reasoning will have to begin again, with every 
experience that relates either directly or indirectly with the food system. This is the nature of 
„practising provisionality‟. This reasoning is further thickened by the fact that, “if the moral 
community is not limited to people in one place, neither is it limited to people at any one 
time” (Rachels & Rachels, 2007:200). For example, we will have to consider the context and 
values of those that would live in time of extreme global warming. Of course, we would not 
know the exact circumstances, but it is still our moral responsibility to consider this. In this 
light, we will have to approach our understanding of inter-generational and intra-generational 
justice, with regard to the food system, as a slow and reflective journey, not a „quick fix‟ kind 
of thing. 
As such, when reasoning through the difficulties of making moral choices in the changing 
context of the food system, we must take advantage of the potential insight that exists in 
ethical discourse. Ideally, this would accommodate all those involved in our food system, 
“either directly as farmers, or indirectly as government regulators, extension agents, 
researchers, CEOs, industrial workers, lawmakers, technology developers, consumers, or 
protestors” (Chrispeels & Mandoli, 2003:4). Indeed, by keeping the ethical debate alive, we 
keep a system of ethics alive and relevant in sustainability transitions. However, the necessity 
of reductionism does not give us the luxury to hear everyone‟s moral opinion. And so, 
deliberation on moral dilemmas would stress the importance of being explicit in what has 
been excluded from moral consideration. This ensures that our ethical reasoning remains 
refined, as “good decision-making procedure requires that implicit value judgements be made 
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explicit, so that more of the actual decision-making process becomes visible” (Clayton & 
Radcliffe, 1996:11). Furthermore, this understanding of the foundation of moral judgements 
in this context “ought to lead to more confident judgements” (Zimdahl, 2002:44). 
Of course, there will always be conflicts and disagreements in working towards realising a 
sustainable food system. Food is, after all, a sensitive subject; it is “a matter of culture, 
religion, status and social discourse” (McLachlan & Hamann, 2011:429). Nevertheless, this 
should be something that is used to critically reflect and continuously question the values we 
hold dear. Those involved in the academic inquiry of food systems “must accept the burden 
of beginning the difficult task of doing a discriminating cultural and moral analysis of 
agriculture and its results” (Zimdahl, 2002:51).  In any case, this principle of flexibility 
inherent in „practising provisionality‟ would suggest “a corresponding strategy of conflict 
resolution” (Capra, 1996:303). We must, therefore, let the conflicts and disagreements carry 
on and nurture each other – we must not let them fight, but we must let them play. It helps to 
acknowledge that such hindrances are typical of a blossoming conceptualisation of ethics, in 
that it will be “seldom established in a smooth and orderly fashion ... [and] similar to a 
political revolution, a variety of different and often incompatible outlines, coupled with a 
wide range of protopractices and even social experiments, are tried out” (Hattingh, 1999:80).  
This brings us to the understanding of „practising provisionality‟ as a process of social 
learning. We must accept that, in our ethical journey of realising the sustainability of food 
systems, the arguments about which systemic relationships to sustain will vary, “and much of 
the skill of moral thinking consists in discerning the difference” (Rachels & Rachels, 
2007:12). It is, therefore, not only important that we engage in „practising provisionality‟ so 
as to account for ethical complexity, but also to constantly practise this skill of complex 
ethical reasoning through discourse. Indeed, this is the nature of learning in a social system, 
in that it expands our “understanding of human-environment interactions, and the problems at 
stake” (Cundill & Rodela, 2012:11). So, when we commit to „practising provisionality‟ in the 
context of food systems, “different perspectives ... come together in a learning process 
whereby, in the course of the interaction, implicit knowledge is made explicit, and new 
knowledge is construed, shared and tested” (Drimie & McLachlan, 2013:219). This starts all 
over again at each moral choice, and at every process of complex reasoning, our contextual 
sensibilities become ever-more heightened, like muscle memory. This will, of course, be a 
long arduous journey of social discovery. However, those committed to realising sustainable 
food systems must constantly remind themselves to not only practise this complex ethical 
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reasoning, but also that whilst “we live in a post-industrial, information-age society ... we do 
not, and no one ever will, live in a post-agricultural society” (Zimdahl, 2002:52). 
The extent of moral responsibility that awaits us, as individuals, is as complex as our 
understanding of ethics. However, by reflecting on this realisation in the context of realising 
sustainable food systems, we can now begin to conceptualise this expectation, and practice 
the necessary strategy of provisionality as a process of social learning. Furthermore, we can 
be encouraged that, through constant dedication, practice will make progress, and as such, we 
will slowly learn to address sustainability transitions in a more appropriate and ethical way.  
5.4: Chapter Summary 
This chapter followed on from the insight provided by the previous chapter, in providing an 
appropriate way of thinking about ethics in sustainability transitions – one which accounts for 
complexity. It has been demonstrated how the very way of thinking from a complexity 
perspective is inseparable to its understanding of ethics, and therefore, how such an approach 
is suitably positioned in addressing the ethical complexity of the ever-contingent realities of 
socioecological interactions. 
The first section introduced the imagery that demonstrates how this demanding understanding 
of ethics addresses complexity, namely „practising provisionality‟. Following this 
introduction, the next three sub-sections unpacked the fundamentals of a complex approach 
to ethics, and the implications thereof.  
Firstly, through the imagery of „a renaissance in responsibility‟, the pressure and importance 
of addressing ethical complexity was presented, as well as the demanding strategy to do so. 
Secondly, through the imagery of „collaborative conversations and to be continued‟, it was 
explored how a complex understanding of ethics relishes and revels in the contingency of 
difference and contrasting positions in an ethical context. Thirdly, through the imagery of „an 
emerging ethics in earnest‟, this sub-section highlighted the continuous commitment that is 
needed in „practising provisionality‟, and therefore, complemented the implications of the 
previous two sub-sections by commenting on the how a complex ethics must be regarded as a 
process of social learning.  
The last section of this chapter provided a contextual reflection on a complex approach to 
understanding ethics with regard to food systems, and concentrated on how this will affect 
academic interest in realising sustainable food systems. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
6.1: Closing Remarks 
This thesis has stressed the importance of acknowledging that today‟s polycrises are largely a 
result of yesterday‟s failure of realising the modern dream of order; “the exacerbation of 
rational thought, which manifests itself through the predominance of reductionism and a 
binary and linear logic that, among other shortcomings, separate the observer from the 
observed” (Max-Neef, 2005:10). Therefore, in understanding ethics in sustainability 
transitions, an appreciation of complexity will play a significant role in remedying the 
devastations that have been inflicted, and remedying the minds that have blindly engineered 
these devastations.  
Of course, whilst it would be foolish to throw away reductionist principles completely, it is 
still necessary to highlight how it can manifest in ways that neglect complex contexts and 
claim objectivity, to disastrous effects. In this light, the resonating words of Cilliers 
(1998:127) declare that “liberty and justice will not come about through the imposition of 
universal laws ... nor will science flourish if it maintains a closed shop and speaks a private 
language”. So, whilst the world might find itself in a time that brings doubt and uncertainty, 
academia must engage in this transition of thought – it is our moral responsibility. Indeed, as 
it has been written by Jared Diamond (2005), the relevance of understanding ethics in 
sustainability transitions is that society will choose whether it will collapse or flourish. 
Nevertheless, in response to the excitement of Capra‟s earlier remark, the potentiality of 
complexity thinking is also an “anthropological and historical problem ... of considerably 
greater proportions than the Copernican revolution ... [and] never before in the history of 
humanity have the responsibilities of thinking weighed so crushingly on us” (Morin & Kern, 
1999:132). Scientific research must, therefore, remain in a constant state of learning, so as to 
appropriately adapt to the changing contexts, like that of complex food systems. At the same 
time, however, if we fail to re-orientate our thinking now – if we fail to acknowledge the 
global polycrises as issues that emerge from complex systems, and fail to practise a complex 
ethical reasoning – we gamble with “the kind of social and economic dislocation and collapse 
that a number of earlier societies have already experienced” (Clayton & Radcliffe, 1996:4).  
As such, this thesis declares that now is the time to act, to commit, and to have hope. It is, 
therefore, necessary that the problems of sustainability transitions are addressed “not so much 
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as scientific problems for which we must find technical solutions, but rather as ideas that 
challenge us to think creatively and deeply about how we want to live together on this finite 
planet” (McLachlan & Hamann, 2011:429). Indeed, as Woermann (2013:169) says, “now is 
the time to sow the seeds of new ideas, in the hope that these may take root, grow, and 
blossom in the cracks”. 
6.1.1: Thesis Review 
As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis presented a conceptual analysis to ask what an 
appropriate understanding of ethics would look like, given the context of sustainability 
transitions, particularly with regard to realising sustainable food systems. After an in-depth 
literature review and critical exploration, it has been argued that the dominant paradigm of 
thought and its approach to ethics is inappropriate in its disregard for the contingencies of 
socioecological interactions. As such, the self-critical perspective of complex systems has 
been suggested as an appropriate way of thinking about ethics in sustainability transitions. 
After a brief introduction to the thesis, the dominant way of thinking, referred to as the 
„machine mind‟, was investigated and discussed in the second chapter. As a prolific 
understanding of the dynamic and unpredictable nature of our polycrises roots itself in 
Western academia, this thesis has, therefore, provided a critique on the „machine mind‟ and 
its reliance on strict reductionism, and the conservative binary logic that accompanies it. This 
way of thinking about the world and how we relate to it is extremely unreflective, and as 
such, inadequate. Its avoidance of engaging with the contingencies of complex contexts is 
unacceptable in these times, and whilst it has produced fascinating discoveries and 
technologies, a continuation thereof will risk further misunderstanding of these contexts of 
sustainability transitions. This position is supported, thereafter, by reflecting upon this 
paradigm of thought‟s one-dimensional and narrow-minded interpretation of the issue of food 
security. 
The third chapter saw to complement the previous chapter, and further emphasised the 
inadequacies of the „machine mind‟. This chapter, therefore, investigated and discussed the 
way in which ethics is understood from this strictly reductionist perspective. Similar to its 
ontological and epistemological simplifications, this way of thinking produces overly 
reductionist interpretation of what it means to be ethical, asking only for an obedience to 
moral rules, and in turn, discards the power and possibility of moral choice. Its „engineered 
ethics‟ is ignorant of both the ever-changing story of ethical theory and of the contingencies 
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of moral dilemmas. As such, it offers an unacceptable and misleading response to the 
question of moral responsibility in the context of sustainability transitions. To support this 
critique, this thesis then reflected upon this way of thinking‟s arrogant and unquestionable 
interpretation of morality with regard to realising sustainable food systems. 
After the explorative critique of the traditional paradigm of thought, which dominates current 
academic enquiry, it was necessary that this thesis continued its critical exploration, from 
which a more appropriate way of thinking about ethics in sustainability transitions could be 
provided. 
In chapter four, the paradigm of thought referred to as the „mountain mind‟ was introduced. 
By identifying and elaborating on its fundamental principles, it was revealed that this way of 
thinking acknowledges not only the contingent contexts of complex systems, but also dares to 
approach this reality in complex way itself. The paradigmatic shift in understanding the world 
as organised through dynamic relationships emphasises the incompressible nature of 
complexity, yet the need to apply a soft and slow reductionism. Its sensitivity is further 
supported by a liberal binary logic and a modest engagement with its contextualised 
knowledge claims. As such, the „mountain mind‟ way of thinking offers an appropriate 
alternative to the complications of strict reductionism in addressing sustainability transitions. 
This position is complimented, thereafter, by reflecting upon this way of thinking‟s cautious 
open approach to the issue of food security. 
Following from the previous chapter, the fifth chapter of this thesis saw to explore how this 
complex way of thinking approaches ethics, and comment on its appropriateness. Whilst the 
„mountain mind‟ acknowledges an implicit normativity, the way in which ethics is addressed 
explicitly from this perspective is similarly complex. Rather than insisting on a certain rule of 
ethical behaviour, this thesis revealed how a complexity perspective reasons anew through 
every choice of an „emerging ethics‟ with informed openness and reflection. This suits the 
contingency of ever-changing contexts of complex systems, and the ethical complexity that is 
implied in each experience thereof. The extent of moral responsibility is met with hope, as 
this thesis comments on how this process of ethical reasoning is also a process of learning, 
which will comfort this developing understanding of ethics in sustainability transitions, and 
the trickiness of complex thought. To support the appropriateness of this complex ethics, this 
thesis then reflected upon the tolerance and dedication that is required of an „emerging ethics' 
in realising sustainable food systems. 
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6.2: Limitations of the Research 
Admittedly, this thesis represents only a small part of an evolving resource of academic 
literature on sustainability transitions. Knowledge is always changing, so academia must 
understand the importance of showing modesty when producing knowledge. All researchers 
should welcome receiving feedback and response, so as to continuously explore and learn 
more about the subject of their study. Therefore, in order to build on the debate of complex 
systems and ethics, readers are invited to be constructively critical. To initiate this discussion, 
the limitations and laggings of this philosophical argument will now be openly discussed – to 
exercise a self-critical rationality. 
To begin, it is important to expose the framing strategies of this study. Western literature is 
favoured in this thesis, and it is the source of knowledge from which the argument has 
emerged. However, excluding the significance of the different perspectives and types of 
knowledge from „Other‟ disciplines and cultures has been detrimental to the robustness of 
this thesis‟ argument. Indeed, there is great progress to be made in welcoming previously 
separated sciences, for example Oriental and intuitive science. The argument presented in this 
thesis comes also from a position of youth and idealism. And given the constraints of time 
and funding, this academic study was structured in such a way that it missed out on the 
insight provided by sufficient conversation and collaboration, and was somewhat directed by 
the passion of these values. That being said, the freedom of the academic world is restricted 
by institutional and bureaucratic formalities, and perhaps such an impassioned account is 
needed.  
There is only hope in the promise that change will come from „practising provisionality‟ if 
the message is also heard by academic institutions. It is vital that academia is open to its own 
paradigm shifting. As a result, the attitude of this thesis is such that it is first necessary to 
introduce the message of „practising provisionality‟, even if it is carried on the Western wings 
of youth and idealism. 
In scientific inquiry, when we try and make sense of the world, our research findings will 
always be filtered by our subjectivity and the necessary reductionism employed when 
addressing complex phenomena in ever-changing contexts. This and any other research will 
have to acknowledge, that because of our employment of reductionism, our findings will 
always fall short of accounting for the anything‟s full information and depths of data. This 
thesis acknowledges its own inadequacy. As such, it is necessary that this and all research 
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continues, so as to account for the dynamic system of knowledge – in an attempt to keep up 
with complexity.  
Due to the fact that this study only provided a conceptual analysis of the traditional and an 
alternative paradigms of thought, and their approach to ethics, the most apparent limitations 
and laggings of this study may exist in the fact that it is lacking in field research. Both 
qualitative assessments and quantitative simplifications are excellent ways of both supporting 
and disagree with an argument. The reasons for the lack of field research have already been 
given – the constraints of time and finding meant that all resources had to be concentrated on 
exploring the literature‟s theory. Nevertheless, this arguments‟ message will not be accessible 
to all disciplines, and so it will be important to commit to a transdisciplinary environment in 
closing such gaps.  
Given the small and concentrated literature on social learning, the thesis is also limited in its 
reflections of social learning as a wide concept. Subsequently, there is a possibility that 
readers might have expected a more direct tackling of this concept and the details of such a 
process in research. However, it was never the aim of the thesis to do so, as the concept of 
social learning was only used as a general idea about the importance of societal learning in 
the context of sustainability transitions.  
Lastly, the argument of the thesis is such that its possible application to specific problems in 
food systems research is also limited. Again, it was not the intention to provide solutions to 
this context, but rather to provide an alternative platform from which one can think more 
appropriately about the challenges of food system research in general. 
6.3: Recommendations for Further Research 
The hope is that this research is the start of a project that continues to explore the ethical 
aspect of research in food systems. This argument in this thesis, therefore, offers a whole 
array of possibilities with regard to recommendations for further research. This final part of 
the thesis, however, will be explicit in imaging these possibilities.  
There is opportunity for a lot of empirical field research of any kind that would support or 
challenge the argument through more accessible information, like numbers and factual data. 
Specifically, the notion of „practising provisionality‟ would need to be tested empirically in a 
certain environment to see the effects of this commitment. Of course, this would be 
problematic to measure and decipher, although there are much more creative ways of doing 
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such research than by reducing one‟s observations to numbers. As such, the research would 
more than likely represent another narrative study of journals and personal insight, but this 
would, nevertheless, still prove to be of value. Particular research in the transdisciplinary 
environment would also be welcomed. 
In any case, a dedicated study on this subject could uncover the nature of a certain group‟s 
understanding of ethics as contexts changed. Personally, this kind of research would be 
adequately contextualised in the project team of Social Learning for Sustainable Food 
Systems. In a paradigm of transdisciplinarity, and over a long-term period, qualitative and 
quantitative empirical research of how individuals and groups understanding and approach to 
ethics could compare with the literature as presented in this thesis. From these findings, space 
for social learning and a contextualised development on this area of academia could be 
provided, so as to determine whether the benefits of „practising provisionality‟ have any 
tangible evidence. Thereafter, it could be interesting to see how these findings have 
influenced not only individuals‟ understanding of ethics and their behaviour, but also how 
this has influenced the team‟s own disciplinary research on realising sustainable food 
systems.  
There are other ways to train a way of thinking that accounts for the complex interrelations of 
systems, and when it comes to ethics, „practising provisionality‟ could certainly be supported 
by these other tools. Although there has been mention of our interaction in a complex system 
of ethics as a game, the „systems thinking games‟, as popularised by Linda Booth Sweeney 
and Dennis Meadows (2010) is a very creative option, which brings the fun into systems 
thinking. By playing these games, they allow us “to comprehend and apprehend both the 
working of human beings individually and in groups (with their mental models, habits and 
conventions), and the working of systems (with their feedback loops, interdependencies, 
leverage points, time delays, short-term vs. long-term loops and the structural archetypes of 
different systems) ... [and] also train each player‟s intuition and creativity” (Kagan, 
2010:1097). These games could be used in concrete research to see the consequences of such 
games, and how this would complement „practising provisionality‟. 
It is notable that more research needs to be done to give some credibility to the findings of the 
thesis. Also, and perhaps more importantly, is that it is necessary to continue research so that 
one does not get stuck in the theoretical world. Of course, a conceptual analysis has its 
benefits, but the nature of complex interactions is such that it academics will have to explore 
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more areas of knowledge and understanding that have yet to be popularised, either personally 
or in one‟s discipline. 
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